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LAW AS INSTRUMENTALITY 
JEREMIAH A. HO* 
Our conceptions of law affect how we objectify the law and ultimately how 
we study it.  Despite a century’s worth of theoretical progress in American 
law—from legal realism to critical legal studies movements and 
postmodernism—the formalist conception of “law as science,” as promulgated 
by Christopher Langdell at Harvard Law School in the late-nineteenth century, 
continues to influence the inductive methodologies used today to impart 
knowledge in American legal education.  This lasting influence of the 
Langdellian scientific conception of law has persisted even as the present crisis 
in legal education has engendered other reforms.  However, subsequent 
movements of legal thought have revealed that the law is neither scientific nor 
“objective” in the way the Langdellian formalists once envisioned.  After all, 
the Langdellian scientific objectivity of law itself reflected the dominant class, 
gender, power, and race of its nineteenth-century progenitors.  Thus, by 
sustaining the illusion of scientific objectivity, the continued application of 
Langdellian pedagogy distorts our understandings of law and abridges 
individual explorations of pluralism, subjectivity, justice, and empowerment.  
Such prevailing false notions of neutrality in law leads to both disenchantment 
and hierarchy in legal practice, but worse it also distracts from meanings of 
law that would otherwise have led to empowerment and critique.  In this way, 
legal scholars have clamored for a post-Langdellian legal conception to enable 
us to reach more relevant and emboldened meanings in law.   
Prompted by such calls amidst the post-Recession crisis in the American 
legal academy, this Article offers such a new conception for theorizing 
meanings in law by locating law within its instrumentalities.  “Law as 
instrumentality” obtains meaning by accepting law’s fragmentation and then 
observing, from fragmentation, the characteristics of its agency.  The law is not 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Massachusetts School of Law.  I would like to thank Emma 
Wood, Jessica Dziedzic, and Erica G. Sylvia for initial research assistance, and also Paolo G. Corso 
and Kurt J. Hagstrom for research assistance in later drafts.  My thanks also go to Lawrence Solum 
and Dan Ernst for their glances at this piece.  As always, I am grateful to the University of 
Massachusetts School of Law for funding my research.  I am also indebted to the staff and editors of 
the Marquette Law Review, particularly editors Michael Chargo and Nathan Oesch, for such detailed 
work.  And finally, much thanks to Nancy Szott and Michael Evans for serving in their own capacities 
as gracious reminders of the normative work ahead.   
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a science; but it does embody human-made qualities of agency.  This new 
instrumentality conception studies law’s deliberate aesthetics as a way to 
explore law ontologically and critique its goals, its devices, its intentions, its 
significances, and its teleologies.  From this conception, a broader 
methodology can arise to bring about a more relevant and empowering 
understanding of law to those who render it to life.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers are typically a pessimistic lot.1  For better or worse examples of 
this age old observation have reared themselves noticeably during this present 
crisis in American legal academy and education2—a period that has drifted 
perilously on tides of the Great Recession.3  Observations based on popular 
psychology tend to avoid being completely truthful on a particular subject.4  
 
1. See Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33, 39–41 
(2001) (characterizing lawyers as pessimistic and describing the causes of such pessimism in lawyers).   
2. See, e.g., David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html [https://perma.cc/AC6T-QSN4] (“But 
improbably enough, law schools have concluded that life for newly minted grads is getting sweeter . . . .  
How do law schools depict a feast amid so much famine?”); Megan McArdle, The Perils of Law 
School: A Chat with Paul Campos, Author of Don’t Go to Law School!, THE DAILY BEAST (Sept. 24, 
2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/24/the-perils-of-law-school.html 
[https://perma.cc/6UU5-4LCU].  During the interview Campos stated, “Yes indeed, but the waterline 
has now risen so high that large portions of the classes at top ten law schools are struggling, so now 
there’s a ‘crisis.’”  Id.  
3. Jordan Weissmann, What Do Lawyers and Bankers Have in Common? They Lost Jobs in 
2011, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/01/what-do-
lawyers-and-bankers-have-incommon-they-lost-jobs-in-2011/251130/ [https://perma.cc/3EJ3-P4GG].   
4. See Peter Brooks, Law, Therapy, Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 227, 237 (2001) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s substituting of “popular psychology” for “common sense” in a 
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Every once in a while, however, an observation reveals a beacon of truth.5  Not 
long after national enrollment amongst law schools began to decline and the 
outside world took notice with scrutiny in 2011,6 the word, “crisis,” was first 
uttered within the legal academy.7  From its initial nervous whisper, this 
utterance of crisis did not go unheard.8  At first, there were defensive stances 
of denial.9  Very shortly, nonetheless, the facade of denial gave way to reveal a 
deep sense of anxiety—the contagious kind that spreads rapidly amongst a 
group of pessimistic individuals.10  Once the anxiety set in, the halls of the 
American legal academy, as narrow as they are hallowed, served as an echo 
chamber, repeating and amplifying and ruminating over the notion of crisis 
until the noise became a collective cry of distress.11  Then not long after, distress 
crystallized into action by law school and university administrations and much 
of it was swift in a corporate sense: cut-backs on faculty scholarship monies,12 
 
criminal decision as “rhetorical self-blinding”); see also Mary L. Tenopyra, A Scientist-Practitioner’s 
Viewpoint on the Admissibility of Behavioral and Social Scientific Information, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 194, 197 (1999) (“[P]opular psychology that obtains considerable publicity is often at odds 
with scientific psychology.”).   
5. See Kevin W. Saunders, The Framers, Children, and Free Expression, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 187, 235 (2011) (noting how academic psychology and popular psychology are 
something in accord).   
6. Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 177, 185 
(2012); Weissmann, supra note 3.   
7. See McArdle, supra note 2.   
8. See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and the Competition in Legal Education: 
A Sociological Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal Profession and Legal Education, 24 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 503 (2013); Campos, supra note 6, at 179.   
9. See Segal, supra note 2 (“But improbably enough, law schools have concluded that life for 
newly minted grads is getting sweeter. . . . How do law schools depict a feast amid so much famine?”). 
10. Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/an-existential-crisis-for-law-schools.html 
[https://perma.cc/QB9W-H8SC] (“Law schools have hustled to compensate for these shifts by trying 
to make it look as if their graduates are more marketable, even hiring them as research assistants to 
offer temporary employment.  But those strategies won’t fix legal education . . . .”).   
11. ABA COMM’N ON THE IMPACT OF THE ECON. CRISES ON THE PROFESSION AND LEGAL 
NEEDS, THE VALUE PROPOSITION OF ATTENDING LAW SCHOOL (2009), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/lsd/legaled/value.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XYE7-RV4S].   
12. Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Future of Scholarship in Law Schools, 31 TOURO L. REV. 15, 19 (2014) 
(“In the past few years, these scholarship incentives have been reduced or withdrawn, a trend that is 
likely to continue into the foreseeable future.”).   
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buy-outs,13 rebuke,14 rumors of school closures,15 reduction in staff,16 and pull-
backs on faculty hiring,17 to name a few.  Simultaneously, a series of how-to 
reform legal education articles and books bombarded the literature.18  A blame 
game began to surface from all directions.19  On a day-to-day level at law 
schools, reports of dramatic changes prompted by apprehension and concern at 
law school were not uncommon.20  In studying all of these events as part of 
classic pessimistic behavior, these responses should not surprise ourselves; in 
times of real or perceived crisis, pessimists (lawyers and law professors 
included) will often abandon ship, reach for a raft of security, and internalize 
obsessively about self-preservation—all the while hopefully searching for a 
new course.21 
 
13. Mary Moore, New England Law Offers Faculty Buyouts, Dean Takes Pay Cut, BOSTON BUS. 
J. (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2013/10/29/new-england-law-dean-pay-
buyout.html [https://perma.cc/R65J-CWRC].   
14. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF 
PROFESSIONALISM 17 (2014) (“[L]aw schools’ current business model is not only unsustainable but 
immoral.”).   
15. See Erin Fuchs, The Law School Crisis Could Crush ‘Stand-Alone’ Schools, BUS. INSIDER 
(Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/which-law-schools-might-fail-2013-1 
[https://perma.cc/5CG5-V2RN].   
16. Ashby Jones & Jennifer Smith, Amid Falling Enrollment, Law Schools Are Cutting Faculty, 
WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2013), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323664204578607810292433272 
[https://perma.cc/5S6F-NMFD] (reporting law schools’ faculty lay-offs after “having trimmed staff”); 
Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Schools Cope With Declining Enrollment by Quietly Cutting Faculty, ABA 
J. (July 16, 2013), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_schools_cope_with_declining_enrollment_by_quietly_
cutting_faculty [https://perma.cc/AVJ2-CGM6]. 
17. Law Schools Put Hiring Freeze on Faculty, N.J. BUS. (Oct. 12, 2012), 
http://www.njbiz.com/article/20121012/NJBIZ01/121019932/law-schools-put-hiring-freeze-on-
faculty [https://perma.cc/9H6B-CSYE].   
18. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Educating Lawyers for Community, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 115 
(2012); Farida Ali, Globalizing the U.S. Law School Curriculum: How Should Legal Educators 
Respond?, 41 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 249 (2013); Beverly Petersen Jennison, Beyond Langdell: 
Innovating in Legal Education, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 643 (2013).   
19. See, e.g., Paul Campos, Stop Blaming the Law School Bubble on the 2007 Financial Crisis, 
BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-caused-the-law-school-bubble-
2013-2 [https://perma.cc/6N35-LQSE]; Bruce Feldthusen, Legal Profession in Turmoil: Let’s Blame 
the Law Schools, CANADIAN LAW. MAG. (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/4429/Legal-profession-in-turmoil-Lets-blame-the-law-
schools.html [https://perma.cc/TC95-GDTX].   
20. See, e.g., Alicia Albertson, New England Law Downsizing Enrollment, Faculty Size, NAT’L. 
JURIST (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.nationaljurist.com/prelaw/new-england-law-downsizing-
enrollment-faculty-size [https://perma.cc/PL4B-3X8R].   
21. See F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 11–12 (1988).   
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At first, internalization from within the legal academy came most notably 
from Brian Tamanaha and his book, Failing Law Schools,22 which prominently 
attempted to explain the economic causes of the post-Recession law school 
crisis.23  Although Tamanaha was not the only one critiquing law schools from 
a financial perspective,24 his work was arguably the most widely read and 
discussed.25  In Failing Law Schools, Tamanaha argued that the post-Recession 
law school crisis had essentially two culprits.  First, law school tuitions had 
surpassed inflation to amounts that heavily burdened students with outstanding 
debt upon graduation.26  He culled through much empirical data to demonstrate 
the phenomena of this debt-to-inflation ratio.27  But even as he cites an 
anecdotal example by comparing different generations of law students, his 
point was rather illustrative: 
Law students in the seventies and early eighties who worked at 
corporate law firms during the summer could earn enough to 
cover the following year’s tuition and perhaps some living 
expenses.  This helped keep down the level of debt.  Despite 
the dramatic increase in starting associate pay at corporate law 
firms that occurred in the early 2000s, the best-paying summer 
jobs today, which few students land, generate enough income 
for a student to pay half, at most, of one year’s tuition at a top 
school.28   
Such debt-to-inflation ratios, Tamanaha observed, would impede upon new 
law school graduates’ options as they move into their careers.29  Money, after 
all, gives one options in employment and life-style.  But he was not finished 
yet; another causal reason for the crisis, Tamanaha observed, was that post-
 
22. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).   
23. See id. 
24. See, e.g., PAUL CAMPOS, DON’T GO TO LAW SCHOOL (UNLESS): A LAW PROFESSOR’S 
GUIDE TO MAXIMIZING OPPORTUNITY AND MINIMIZING RISK (2012); Campos, supra note 6; 
McArdle, supra note 2.   
25. See generally David Burk, Book Review, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 349 (2013) (reviewing BRIAN 
Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012)); Charles Lane, Book Review: ‘Failing Law Schools’ 
by Brian Z. Tamanaha¸ WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/book-
review-failing-law-schools-by-brian-z-tamanaha/2012/ [https://perma.cc/UY3A-S2L6] (insert URL 
into Google.com search engine, then follow “Book Review: Failing Law Schools by Brian Z. 
Tamahana” hyperlink). 
26. See TAMANAHA, supra note 22, at 108.   
27. See id. at 108–09.   
28. Id. at 109.   
29. See, e.g., id. at 111–12 (citing an example with a law student named “Sarah”).   
HO - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/17  2:46 PM 
136 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:131 
graduation employment levels at law schools were in jeopardy.30  The shrunken 
post-2008 legal job market was not able to allow the adequate match between 
the number of attorney jobs available and the number of new graduates that law 
schools were producing.31  According to Tamanaha, instead of reducing the size 
of classes, “[l]aw schools responded to this abysmal job environment by 
increasing the number of students they enrolled in 2009, and yet again in 
2010—thereby promising to throw out even more law graduates onto the 
saturated employment pool three years hence.”32  Of course, he was not the sole 
voice to make these inspections on law school business practices.33  Critics, 
both within legal education and beyond, similarly targeted the economics of 
law schools during this era of crisis.34   
This opportunity for deep internalization in legal education, led by 
Tamanaha’s book, also prompted and stoked critiques of other aspects of legal 
education, particularly in the effects that recent cultural and generational shifts 
in law students have had on law schools and professionalism,35 and also on the 
uses of new technology in law teaching.36  At first, the discussion of cultural 
and curricular reform in law schools (particularly those that resembled the 
Carnegie Report,37 MacCrate,38 and Best Practices)39 going into the Great 
Recession were sidelined briefly for a time, perhaps as the academy’s attention 
was honing in on too-big-to-fail characterizations of law school business and 
 
30. Id. at 145–60.   
31. Id. at 167.   
32. Id.   
33. See generally STEVEN J. HARPER, THE LAWYER BUBBLE: A PROFESSION IN CRISIS (2013); 
William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461 (2013); CAMPOS, supra note 
24.   
34. See CAMPOS, supra note 24; HARPER, supra note 33; Henderson, supra note 33. 
35. See, e.g., Emily A. Benfer & Colleen F. Shanahan, Educating the Invincibles: Strategies for 
Teaching the Millennial Generation in Law School, 20 N.Y.U. CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2013); Susan 
Swaim Daicoff, Expanding the Lawyer’s Toolkit of Skills and Competencies: Synthesizing Leadership, 
Professionalism, Emotional Intelligence, Conflict Resolution, and Comprehensive Law, 52 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 795 (2012).   
36. Brittany Stringfellow Otey, Millennials, Technology, and Professional Responsibility: 
Training a New Generation in Technological Professionalism, 37 J. LEGAL PROF. 199 passim (2013). 
37. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION 
OF LAW (2007).   
38. ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 137–41 (1992). 
39. ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007).   
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marketing practices rather than pedagogical reforms.40  But as interest in the 
economic narratives of law schools began to even out, scholarly discussions 
regarding the old skills-versus-doctrinal debate in law teaching reignited—
particularly because, in light of low employment statistics, the teaching of skills 
would, in theory, contribute to the competency and employability of students 
and graduates.41  Still that shift proceeded cautiously,42 and some articles in 
advocating skills and practice during this time took on a neoliberalist tone.43  
Others in the academy, such as Edward Rubin and Robin West, have called for 
more profound changes to the core philosophy of American law teaching and 
pedagogy at this time instead.44  However, such critical observations have taken 
a backseat to more short-term solutions on teaching skills because an overhaul 
of legal pedagogy would require a deeper connection drawn between 
perspectives on the meaning of law itself and its underlying theory.45  In short, 
despite all the crisis-talk and inward obsessions, the current subject matter of 
teaching of law students has a large body of technical insight and pedagogical 
discourse, but lacks any unifying sense of what modern law schools ought to 
look like beyond the nineteenth-century model promulgated by Christopher 
Langdell at Harvard Law School.46   
 
40. See Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School Disappoints Law Students, The 
Public, And The Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 219, 231 (2007) (“Langdell’s method endures 
because, although his pedagogy no longer makes sense, his system makes money.”).   
41. See, e.g., Ali, supra note 18; Jennison, supra note 18.   
42. See Benfer & Shanahan, supra note 35, at 5–6.   
43. Margaret Thornton, Legal Education in the Corporate University, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 19, 23 (2014).  Thornton writes that, in law schools, “[t]he discourse of skills also carries a subtext 
with it . . . with the term often being ‘used interchangeably with capacity, knowledge, expertise and so 
forth.’  Skills tend to play a special role in the neoliberal labor market and are privileged over critical 
and theoretical knowledge.”  Id. (citation omitted).   
44. See Edward Rubin, The Future and Legal Education: Are Law Schools Failing and, If So, 
How?, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 499, 507 (2014) [hereinafter Rubin, Future and Legal Education] 
(“What is its future and what should that future be?  For that we need to adopt a broader perspective 
than the existing market for lawyers and a longer timeframe than the immediate crisis and its near-term 
resolution.”); WEST, supra note 14, at 23.   
45. See Dolin, supra note 40, at 246–47 (“In this environment, it is extremely unlikely that 
meaningful change will come from within the academy. . . .  Practitioners have been intimidated by 
the professorate, assuming that they know better than practitioners the best way to educate practicing 
lawyers.  However, they do not.”).   
46. WEST, supra note 14, at 27–35.   
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There have been some meaningful changes.47  As an era of reckoning drew 
near, accountability—moral and economic—descended upon the academy like 
swift justice.  Questions of relevance regarding American law schools and 
traditional legal education have steered many law schools to quickly add 
phrases such as “practice ready” and “experiential learning” alongside their 
traditional curricular programming and offerings in order to demonstrate that 
their current and prospective students would get their monies’ worth.48  In 
earnest, law school institutions had thoughtful intentions when they 
strengthened such parts of the law school experience that had been previously 
auxiliary.49  In theory and practice, this first wave of change had positive 
effects. Building up clinical legal education, externship, and pro bono 
requirements at law schools facilitates law graduate competency and, 
hopefully, marketability.50  They also reflect an acknowledgement that law 
practice is something one learns, in part, by doing.51  After all, was it not 
Holmes who said that the life of the law was not merely logic but also 
experience?52 
More questionably, a second wave of change came along that mandated 
learning assessments in legal education.53  In 2015, the American Bar 
Association (ABA) passed Standards 301, 302, 314, and 315  that required law 
schools to conduct learning assessments,54 and subsequently the law schools 
began to obey.55  Although some in the academy have urged for decades for 
law schools to implement learning assessments while others have vilified 
assessments,56 the crisis precipitated the ABA to pass what had only been a 
 
47. Nancy J. Knauer, Learning Communities: A New Model for Legal Education, 7 ELON L. 
REV. 193, 195–98 (2015).   
48. See id.   
49. See Marjorie A. Silver, Symposium Introduction: Humanism Goes to Law School, 28 TOURO 
L. REV. 1141, 1171 (2012) (“Among other changes designed to expose students to what lawyers 
actually do in practice, we incorporated a requirement . . . that each of us spend a significant portion 
of the course teaching our students about alternatives to litigation.”).   
50. See Knauer, supra note 47, at 196–98, 208.   
51. See id.   
52. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).   
53. ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES 
OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS: 2015–2016, at 23 (2015).   
54. Id. at 15–25.   
55. David Thomson, When the ABA Comes Calling, Let’s Speak the Same Language Assessment, 
23 PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 68 (2014).   
56. Compare GREGORY S. MUNRO, OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS (2000), with 
Susan Hanley Duncan, The New Accreditation Standards Are Coming to A Law School Near You–
What You Need to Know About Learning Outcomes & Assessment, 16 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL 
WRITING INST. 605, 610 (2010).   
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proposal and now all law schools have begun in-house assessments of student 
learning and competency.57  The undergraduate campuses of colleges and 
universities had been engaged in these practices since the early 1980s.58  So 
when American legal education began to embrace the assessment movement in 
higher education, some suggested this embrace signified that law schools had 
finally caught up with the rest of American higher education.59  Conferences 
regarding assessments have, since then, taken place on various law school 
campuses nationwide.60  Faculty exchange of assessment rubrics have become 
more commonplace.61  Thoughts of distilling teaching and pedagogy into 
metrics and measurables have consumed much faculty governance, of late.62  
On the surface, the learning assessment movement offers a solution with the 
theme of accountability prevalent during law schools in crisis-mode, 
particularly because law schools had been famous for little assessment action.63  
Law schools can now claim that they are being thoughtful or self-reflective in 
response to questions about relevance that have existed in the past several 
decades of law teaching.  After redesigning business models and career 
engagement, measuring how law is taught and what students learn seems like 
one method to address the curricular and pedagogical issues that have haunted 
 
57. MICHELLE R. PISTONE & MICHAEL B. HORN, DISRUPTING LAW SCHOOL: HOW DISRUPTIVE 
INNOVATION WILL REVOLUTIONIZE THE LEGAL WORLD 17 (2000), 
https://www.christenseninstitute.org/publications/disrupting-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/8B4T-
PEVV]. 
58. Peter T. Ewell, Assessment, Accountability, and Improvement: Revisiting the Tension, NAT’L 
INST. FOR LEARNING OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT, Nov. 2009, at 5–6 (citing Peter T. Ewell, Assessment, 
Accountability, and Improvement: Managing the Contradiction (American Ass’n for Higher Educ., 
May 1987)), http://www.learningoutcomeassessment.org/documents/PeterEwell_005.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AQ8Y-B25Y]. 
59. See Anthony Niedwiecki, Law Schools and Learning Outcomes: Developing a Coherent, 
Cohesive, and Comprehensive Law School Curriculum, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 661, 664–65 (2016) (“In 
light of these fundamental changes, criticisms, recommendations, and requirements, law schools must 
now be more deliberate in the planning of their curriculum so it is coherent, cohesive, and 
comprehensive.”).   
60. See, e.g., April 2014: Assessment Across the Curriculum, INST. FOR LAW TEACHING & 
LEARNING (Apr. 2014), http://lawteaching.org/conferences/april-2014-assessment-across-the-
curriculum/ [https://perma.cc/AB5C-W5B4].   
61. See, e.g., Resources, INST. FOR LAW TEACHING & LEARNING, 
http://lawteaching.org/resources/ [https://perma.cc/JA4T-3GRA] (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).   
62. Ron M. Aizen, Four Ways to Better 1L Assessments, 54 DUKE L.J. 765, 779–84 (2004).   
63. Id. at 767 (“[F]irst-year law students typically receive course grades based entirely, or almost 
entirely, on single end-of-course essay exams.  Using a single exam to measure law student 
performance contrasts markedly with earlier practices at American law schools.”).   
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American legal education for decades—issues that many have highlighted as 
reasons law schools have become irrelevant in the wake of the post-recession.64  
Perhaps this was an apt time to show the world that American legal education 
was finally on the move.   
But while many have written about the pros and cons of assessment and 
explored exactly how to assess,65 few people have contemplated the big, 
existential, “So what?” questions once law schools have done their 
assessments.  What exactly are we trying to find through assessments?  And 
will we find it?  Genuine, thoughtful motivations to perform in-house 
assessments keep law schools accountable,66 but political motivations for 
requiring assessments is not a moral response to the law school crisis.  In this 
way, over-blown, chest-pounding hopes that assessments will overhaul 
American legal education ought to be suspect and tamed.  The assessments 
movement in legal education is only skin-deep; it is a new fad.67  Not only that, 
but the fad is one that officially ushers the view that law schools are now part 
of the age of neoliberalism and corporatized higher education institutions.68  
Should all of this give pessimists some pause?  Absolutely.  To be sure, done 
earnestly and correctly, learning assessments offer much utility to improve 
quality education.  But the process is short-sighted when we neglect what we 
will do after the results of assessment have come in, and allow our results to 
 
64. Campos, supra note 6, at 180 (discussing the increase in tuition cost and the elimination of 
a political commitment to legal education); id. at 185 (noting drop in faculty-to-student ratio).   
65. See Aizen, supra note 62; Niedwiecki, supra note 59.  
66. Bonnie Urciuoli, The Language of Higher Education Assessment: Legislative Concerns in A 
Global Context, 12 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 183, 188 (2005) (quoting The State of American Higher 
Education: What Are Parents, Students, and Taxpayers Getting for their Money?: Hearing Before the 
House Committee on Education and the Workforce, 108th Cong. 1–3 (2003) (statement of Rep. John 
Boehner, Comm. Chairman)).   
67. See Niedwiecki, supra note 59, at 666.   
68. See Urciuoli, supra note 66, at 183–84 (“While most academics have never found any simple 
answers to this question, the corporate and government voices initiating these calls for assessment have 
tended for the past century to see higher education in terms of workforce preparation.  Since 1980 or 
so, a globalized rhetoric of skills and workforce preparedness has emerged with which U.S. discourses 
of education, skills, and work have become tightly coherent.  In effect, this has become the new global 
‘common sense’ rhetoric of workforce preparedness.  Moreover, this globalized neoliberal discourse 
has often taken place in conservative social and political contexts, giving it not only the aura of 
common sense but of moral correctness as well.  In this discourse, the central point of educational 
assessment is the assessment of skills that have a workplace payoff, skills having become a general 
term for practices or forms of knowledge that fit a worker into a job.  Education as a process of 
inculcating skills is ideally cast as a life-long investment in human capital.  Such rhetoric of education 
and continual skill improvement deflects attention from the structural changes of late capitalism.”); 
Thornton, supra note 43, at 23.   
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skew responses that all is good with our status quo.  In this way, the assessment 
process is also not completely objective and scientific.   
This Article is about answering the yearning for a lasting, meaningful 
change to American law teaching philosophy in this time of crisis for American 
law schools.  As Robin West has articulated, “just as we cannot address our 
economic crisis in a meaningful way without also addressing the existential, we 
cannot do the inverse of that either.”69  A little over a century’s time of 
establishing and formalizing a significant tradition of American legal education 
has passed.70  Yet still, law schools continue to impart knowledge and training 
using a pedagogy steeped in the nineteenth century71—while the current state 
of the law and law practice has surpassed a reliance on the common law, and 
while predominant ways of reaching doctrinal resolutions to new controversies 
and disputes do not always rely on reading ancient and seminal appellate 
decisions.  It is no wonder why lawyers are pessimistic.  We are taught to be 
that way as an indirect result of our current pedagogy.72  The optimistic silver 
lining in this time of crisis ought to have been a moment of clarity that allowed 
us to examine with critical and scholarly eyes what relevance a methodology 
guided by “law as science,” in the Langdellian sense, remained presently.  How 
we envision the law manifests in the pedagogy and methods of its study.  What 
this Article offers is a new paradigm for conceptualizing meaning in law for the 
purpose of engendering more relevance and empowerment—a paradigm that 
can navigate beyond assessments, but more importantly, allow individuals to 
think rigorously and learn about the law in a more current and meaningful way.  
This Article’s ultimate recommendation for the American legal academy is to 
move toward a post-Langdellian conception of law that perceives and defines 
law by its deliberate instrumentalities, rather as a form of science.  The ensuing 
pages, hopefully, will clarify the meaning of that heuristic shared by this 
Article’s title, “law as instrumentality.”   
This Article theorizes the type of deep and profound reform that not only 
will help restrain the pessimists from jumping ship but changes that American 
legal education deserves.  Apart from this Introduction, Part II of this Article 
will discuss the specific history and background of American legal education 
 
69. WEST, supra note 14, at 212.   
70. Jennison, supra note 18, at 646 (“Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced the 
methodology currently known as the ‘case method’ to Harvard Law School in 1870, largely shaping 
modern legal education.”).   
71. Dolin, supra note 40, at 222.   
72. Id. at 224 (“The Socratic-Casebook method through which law students are taught is not only 
pedagogically ineffective, but is downright damaging to their mental and emotional health.”).   
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and the rise of the Langdellian case method pedagogy in American law schools.  
Part III will then examine the case method’s effects on modern-day students.  
Finally, before the Article’s conclusion, Part IV will introduce the 
instrumentality conception of law and its underlying philosophy that shifts 
away from the unified and scientific paradigm of the Langdellian scientific 
conception by theorizing law from fragmentation and then gathering meaning 
from the human-made aspects of law’s agency.  A brief exploration of what a 
law classroom situated by “law as instrumentality” might look like 
pedagogically will occur in Part IV as well.   
II. THE GHOST SHIP OF LANGDELLIAN FORMALISM 
A. Origin and Influence in Methodology 
Our inquiry begins by lowering our sails in the late nineteenth century.  
Especially in the last several decades of historicism, some debate has emerged 
regarding the complete and total attribution of the case method to Christopher 
Langdell.73  Although scholars have documented and mapped out a general 
insight regarding Langdell’s law teachings, philosophy, and tenure at Harvard 
Law School,74 some have suggested that much sifting and combing is still 
needed but may never be completely done in terms of a comprehensive study 
of the man.75  After all, the archives at Harvard house some 7,000 pages of 
Langdell’s own notes, taken on loose-leaf in his illegible hand, a majority of 
which remain yet to be deciphered.76  Additionally, another several thousand 
pages of his papers were purposely destroyed in the 1940s, perhaps as suggested 
in a reactionary fit of the legal realists, based on ideological splits from the 
 
73. See Bruce A. Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of Historiography, 
1906–2000s, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 277, 296–97 (2004).  Kimball notes that 
[p]articularly in regard to [Langdell’s] signature teaching method, the revisionists 
maintained that Langdell did not invent case method or that, if he did, then he did 
not really practice it or that, if he invented and practiced it, then he really did not 
understand its nature and purpose.  Demonstrated by their inconsistency, the 
purpose of these efforts was apparently to elevate a revered mentor, as in the case 
of Beale, or the favorite son of a law school, as with Columbia or Mississippi, or 
generally to demonstrate that “not literally all good things are first thought of in 
Cambridge.”   
Id. at 297 (quoting ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 
372 (1921)).   
74. See, e.g., id. at 278.  
75. See id. at 330–31.   
76. Id. at 281.   
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formalists.77  All in all, not unlike our knowledge of many other figures in 
history, there will always be something unknowable and incomplete in our 
understanding of Langdell and his contributions to modern American legal 
education.78  Over the years, that gap in our conscious knowledge of Langdell 
has likely supported our awe,79 our reverence,80 our vilification,81 our parody,82 
and our revision of his legacy83—for whatever goals, such reactions have served 
 
77. See id.  Kimball observed that “some 3,000 papers—possibly including letters, financial 
records, and lectures—were discarded in 1941” and that “this literal trashing of Langdell occurred 
contemporaneously with the high tide of Holmes’s ‘hagiography.’”  Id.  Kimball later described the 
hagiography of Holmes as a period when the legal realists interjected “a uniformly derogatory view of 
Langdell” that peaked at a “high water mark” with the destruction of Langdell’s papers when the 
realists dominated American legal thought.  Id. at 304–05.   
78. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Osler, Langdell, and the Atelier: Three Tales of Creation in 
Professional Education, 10 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 151, 185 (2013) (“[I]n the legal 
profession for which he invented the signature pedagogical method, Langdell is virtually unknown.”).   
79. Austen G. Fox, Professor Langdell—His Personal Influence, 20 HARV. L. REV. 7, 7–8 
(1906) (eulogizing Langdell by noting that when he started teaching at Harvard students knew “that a 
great teacher had come among [them] and [they] were led to seek [him] out”).  
80. WILLIAM LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL 
EDUCATION 168–70 (1994) (defending Langdell against criticisms of his contributions to legal 
education and the case method).   
81. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 907–08 (1933) 
(painting Langdell as misguided in his practice of law and how that translated to some of his 
development of the case method and why, “[d]ue to Langdell’s idiosyncracies, law school law came 
to mean ‘library-law’”).   
82. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 5 (1974).  Gilmore famously begins his book 
with a remark about the centennial development of Langdell’s work on contracts, specifically 
observing that “[i]t was just a hundred years ago that Christopher Columbus Langdell, like his 
namesake four centuries earlier, set sail over uncharted seas and inadvertently discovered a New 
World.”  Id.   
83. See Kimball, supra note 73, at 311 (observing that during the mid-twentieth century, “the 
scholarship on Langdell had ignored most of the evidence that would normally be considered in a 
scholarly analysis of a historical figure”).   
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our purposes.84  Ultimately, however, such endeavors always fail in obtaining 
a definitive truth of the matter85: we can never really know a person.86   
Of course, a funny irony one might draw from all of this is a parallel 
between the futility of completely getting to know a person, such as Langdell, 
and the way in which Langdell’s nineteenth-century theorizing of law as 
science itself—presuming law to be unified and complete in nature, formalistic 
and objective in approach87—had its own futility and shortcomings as well.88  
The philosophical wheels in one’s mind can readily churn away at reconciling 
those observations; but whatever shortcomings and contestations exist over 
fully crediting Langdell with the case method in American law schools, all 
controversies step aside for the fact that such a pedagogy has defined American 
law teaching for over a century’s time.89  That observation is, indeed, true, with 
ample examples to bolster it.90  Arising in the 1870s, the case method was one 
of the features of the new law school model in American universities, promoted 
strongly by Harvard Law School through the teachings and innovations of 
 
84. See, e.g., Jeremiah A. Ho, Function, Form, and Strawberries: Subverting Langdell, 64 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 656 (2015) (using Langdell as a counterpoint for developing active learning methods); 
see also GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977) (“[I]f Langdell had not existed, 
we would have had to invent him.”); GILMORE, supra note 82, 109 n.20 (alteration in original) 
(“Professor Sutherland reproduces an astonishing portrait of Langdell (‘painted . . . in the twenty-
second year of [His] deanship’) which could perfectly well be a portrait of the original Christopher 
Columbus.”). 
85. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S, at 55 (1983).   
86. See, e.g., John Henry Schlegel, Book Review, 14 LAW & HIST. REV. 369 (1996) (reviewing 
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) and 
WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL 
EDUCATION (1994)).  In comparing two books on Langdell, Schlegel observes how one book’s context 
was “infinitely deeper” than the other’s but was still “simply not deep enough.  No one’s ever is, of 
course.”  Id. at 372.   
87. WEST, supra note 14, at 71 n.70 (noting that the Langdellian formalists believed in the 
“autonomy and completeness of the common law: the common law was autonomous from all other 
legal orders as well as from all other sources of authority, whether cultural or political, and it was 
sufficient to answer all questions, not just most”).   
88. Patrick McKinley Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. L. REV. 
227, 249 (2002) (“While imputing the prestige of science to law, Langdell and those in his image 
simply fail to tell us exactly what the ‘legal scientist’ is doing to know law’s ‘axioms.’”)   
89. Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REV. 517, 
520–21 (1991).   
90. See id. at 527–31 (discussing Langdell’s influence on the ideology of law as science and how 
that was taught to students at Harvard); see also id. at 531 (describing Langdell’s development of the 
casebook); id. at 532 (discussing Langdell’s recasting of the “professor’s role” in the classroom through 
the Socratic method).   
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Langdell.91  Although the use of appellate opinions in law teaching was not 
necessarily new,92 the case method’s wholesale pedagogical emphasis on court 
opinions was embraced as a novelty for the study of law,93 which itself was fast 
becoming an academic discipline during this time.94  Summarily, the case 
method’s features involve the use of appellate court cases to demonstrate 
common law principles within a specific body of law.95  Its signature classroom 
technique is two-fold: first, in the use of heavily-edited casebooks that contain 
appellate decisions selected to authoritatively illustrate a legal principle; and 
second, in the classroom use of the Socratic dialogue of inquiry-and-answer 
between lecturer and students, where the lecturer would question students on 
assigned case decisions and hypotheticals in order to extract significant legal 
rules and principles.96   
Along with the eventual rise in prominence of Harvard’s law school, the 
case method—as employed by Langdell and his peers—received gradual 
widespread adoption in the lecture rooms at other law schools in the country.97  
At first, other competing law schools were reluctant to use the method.98  
Eventually, over the twentieth century, however, the case method’s popularity 
gradually gained traction and the acceptance of the method at law schools 
nationwide was systemic.99  In modern-day American law schools, the 
Langdellian case method, despite augmentation with the problem method and 
other teaching techniques, still endures as the dominant form of instruction in 
classrooms.100  Its influence in modeling and developing generations of 
 
91. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 468 (3d ed. 2005).   
92. JAMES WILLIARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 261 
(1950); STEVENS, supra note 85, at 52, 66 n.14.   
93. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 52–53.   
94. Id. at 52.   
95. Id. at 52–53.   
96. PHILIP C. KISSAM, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS: THE MAKING OF MODERN LAWYERS 
37–50 (2003).   
97. Weaver, supra note 89, at 541 n.70 (“Harvard’s status within the education community 
contributed to the method’s acceptance at other schools.” (first citing Robert Maynard Hutchins, Legal 
Education, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 357 (1937); and then citing Eugene Wambaugh, Professor Langdell—A 
View of His Career, 20 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1906))).   
98. See Weaver, supra note 89, at 541–42 (describing how “[t]he transition began slowly” and 
mentioning that, in 1894, the ABA had reported that the lecture method was still prevalent in law 
instruction).   
99. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 64 (observing statistically the rise in number of law schools 
in the early 1900s adopting the case method); see also Jennison, supra note 18, at 646–47.   
100. Weaver, supra note 89, at 543–45.   
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American law faculty has been profound.101  Internationally, the case method 
has its followers at law programs in other countries as well.102  And even pop-
culturally, the case method’s notorious dialogic style of classroom teaching has 
seen its most acerbic Hollywood screen variants.103   
But despite being a teaching method with only two major signature 
characteristics or components (the casebook and the Socratic dialogue),104 these 
characteristics, in principle, underscore a larger conception of the law, one that 
was both personal to Langdell and reflective of the post-Antebellum age of 
American law and law schools: Langdell’s case method was grounded in the 
formalist notion of law as science.105  This conception embodied an ideal of the 
scientific methods applied to the study and practice of law, which Langdell 
considered as a scientific entity in nature.106  The belief was that the result of 
this application would lead one to discover paradigmatic legal principles within 
the world and its disputes.107  Although the law-as-science conception was not 
likely original to Langdell,108 his notion of law as science possessed a certain 
rational empiricism that would have facilitated inquiries upon the law with 
favor toward a nineteenth-century scientific methodology.109  So as science, the 
 
101. See Weaver, supra note 89, at 544 (“At most law schools, one would have difficulty 
obtaining a teaching position if during the interview process he openly stated a preference for the 
lecture method.  Junior faculty who consider other teaching methods may stick with the case method 
for fear of retaliation in the tenure process.  Although faculty are free from such restraints once tenure 
is received, few alter their methods at this point.  They have used the case method for many years and, 
because they received tenure, they have succeeded with that method.”).   
102. See, e.g., Matthew S. Erie, Legal Education Reform in China Through U.S.-Inspired 
Transplants, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 60, 76 (2009) (mentioning how some law schools in China introduced 
teaching approaches in the late 1990s which borrowed from U.S. law schools, including the 
Langdellian case method and Socratic dialogue); see also Weaver, supra note 89, at 543 (noting that 
British law schools use the case method “to varying degrees”).   
103. E.g. LEGALLY BLONDE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2001); THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp. 1973).   
104. See KISSAM, supra note 96, at 37.   
105. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 468–69.   
106. Id.   
107. See Nancy Cook, Law As Science: Revisiting Langdell’s Paradigm in the 21st Century, 88 
N.D. L. REV. 21, 22 (2012) (“The science paradigm advocated by Langdell was rooted in the accepted 
wisdom of the time that the work of science was to uncover—to discover—immutable laws of 
nature.”).   
108. M. H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 95, 120 (1986).   
109. Id. at 119.  Hoeflich notes that Langdell’s approach “had two components: empiricism and 
rationalism.”  Id.  In fact, such attributes added to the method’s appeal with the figures at Harvard 
during Langdell’s time: 
It was the empirical aspect of Langdell’s concept that was most consonant with 
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law must be studied accordingly.  The oft-examined quotation from the preface 
of his original casebook on contract law alludes to the way Langdell conflated 
his scientific conception of the law with the learning of it: 
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or 
doctrines.  To have such a mastery of these as to be able to 
apply them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-
tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true 
lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the 
business of every earnest student of law.  Each of these 
doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow degrees; in 
other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases through 
centuries.  This growth is to be traced in the main through a 
series of cases; and much the shortest and best, if not the only 
way of mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying the 
cases in which it is embodied.110   
Scholars and critics alike have linked Langdell’s conception of the law with 
the other developments at Harvard Law that were auxiliary and yet consistent 
to the rise of the case method in the lecture hall.111  For instance, the law 
library’s development as an important and central space in the law school, akin 
to the scientific laboratory, was a notable feature.112  Other developments such 
as the curriculum,113 the length of a law program,114 faculty as full-time teachers 
 
Harvard President Eliot’s and other contemporaries’ ideas about science.  Science 
was something that one did.  The term connoted investigation and 
experimentation.  Thus, Langdell argued that jurists and legal scholars were also 
empirical investigators.  They sought for legal principles rather than physical 
rules.  The sources of their raw data were not chemical compounds or heavenly 
bodies, but rather legal facts, facts to be found in appellate cases.  The rational 
aspect of the Langdellian notion of legal science dove-tailed with the empirical 
aspect.  The rational aspect of the Langdellian model quite simply was the belief 
that legal reasoning must be deductive.   
Id. at 119–20.  However, Hoeflich also notes that the deductive nature of Langdell’s paradigm reveals 
how “Langdell’s notion of law as a rational science, therefore, was anything but unique or innovative.  
Indeed, to a very large extent, the Langdellian concept of legal science simply echoed Mayes, Legaré, 
Stewart, Leibniz, and other earlier jurists.”  Id. at 120.   
110. C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS WITH REFERENCES 
AND CITATIONS vi (1871).   
111. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 466, 471–72.   
112. Beatrice A. Tice, The Academic Law Library in the 21st Century: Still the Heart of the Law 
School, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 159, 164–65 (2011).   
113. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 471–72.   
114. Id. at 466.   
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and scholars,115 and faculty scholarship116 all reflected this rational and 
empirical scientific conception.   
An illustrative way of unpacking the Langdellian ideal of law as science in 
his case method is to explore the meaning and significance of its most defining 
heuristic: “thinking like a lawyer.”  Although the origins of this phrase is 
unclear, it has characteristically tethered itself as the moniker of what American 
law schools do in training lawyers; and in doing so, serves nearly as an 
imprimatur of the Langdellian case method.117  Indeed, to some certain extent, 
this purpose of the Langdellian law school exemplified his rationalist 
assumptions about the law; if the law is science, then the primary concern of a 
legal education would be to develop the legal mind—and “thinking” would 
extenuate that.118  Over the years, the phrase has weathered both praise and 
criticism,119 and yielded both patina and tarnish.120  Standing from a twenty-
first century vantage point, the phrase in this crisis time appears more tarnished 
than gilded.  Yet, a simple exegetical close-read of the phrase itself helps us 
understand the Langdellian formalism for law and pedagogy that the phrase 
invokes.   
First, “thinking like a lawyer” reveals a scientific conception of law in how 
its form appeals to the scientific inquiry of the nineteenth century.121  
Alternative pedagogical conceptions of law teaching could have been “arguing 
like a lawyer”—which would have emphasized rhetoric or even the concept of 
“law as rhetoric.”  It could have also been “practicing like a lawyer”—which 
would have invariably conceived of “law as process,” or (gasp) “law as a trade,” 
bringing out excessive anxiety in Langdell and many of his Brahmin peers.122  
Here, however, the act of “thinking” is singled out as the sole thing that law 
 
115. Id.   
116. See Kimball, supra note 73, at 283.   
117. Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, Deconstructing Thinking Like A Lawyer: Analyzing the Cognitive 
Components of the Analytical Mind, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 413, 419 (2007) (“Scholars are unsure 
when the phrase ‘thinking like a lawyer’ first became popular, but they consistently trace the origin of 
the concept to the 1870s when Dean Christopher Langdell introduced the case method and Socratic 
method at Harvard Law School.”).  
118. See id. (“Dean Langdell introduced this approach because he believed that law is a science 
and that the scientific method could be suited for use in legal education.”).   
119. See Weaver, supra note 89, at 549–51; Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s 
Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 610–11 (2007).   
120. See Rubin, supra note 119, at 610–11; Weaver, supra note 89, at 595, 561–62. 
121. Gantt, supra note 117, at 413, 419.   
122. See Eric Shimamoto, Comment, To Take Arms Against A See of Trouble: Legal Citation 
and the Reassertion of Hierarchy, 73 UMKC L. REV. 443, 448 (2004) (describing the “image problem” 
that law schools faced as vocational schools that was eventually fixed by Langdell’s reforms).   
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schools must instill, displacing all other functions and engagements between a 
lawyer and the law.123  This isolation of “thinking” is both significant and 
deliberate.  “Thinking,” on one hand, could have been set up here to ignore all 
other things that a practicing lawyer would do; and conversely, it could also 
empirically represent all the things within a Langdellian sensibility that a 
practicing lawyer does—after all, one interpretation of Langdell’s notion for 
“mastering” the “certain doctrines or principles” of law as science is that any 
mastery begins categorically with thinking about the law.124  Either way, 
“thinking like a lawyer” elevates mind over action and underscores that the 
pedagogical crux in Langdell’s case method is a type of inquiry or mental 
perspective that Langdell would have considered lawyerly.125   
If the law is a science, then this type of inquiry would appear to be rigorous, 
but also lofty, and perhaps even abstract at times.  It would not be menial or 
banal, but instead exists as a worthy type of thinking that, like the sciences and 
empiricism, deserved a place at the university.  The use of “thinking” in 
“thinking like a lawyer” perhaps reflected the push for prominence of lawyers 
in the post-antebellum America of the nineteenth century.126  Indeed, that is the 
perception that the case method, as it was classically used in law school lecture 
halls, attempts to convey as it purports to make law students think like 
lawyers.127   
As the examination of appellate opinions proceeds, the Socratic dialogue 
between the professor and students about those case opinions attempts to 
approximate what scientists would do.128  Regardless of whether that is truly 
what scientists do or not, the heart of that “thinking” or inquiry in the law course 
is inductive.  The examination of a closed universe of cases typically assumes, 
in case method fashion, a method of discovery that helps to enlighten upon 
certain legal principles to be used to predict future outcomes of disputes.129  
 
123. Rubin, supra note 119, at 651–52.   
124. See LANGDELL, supra note 110, at vi.   
125. See Rubin, supra note 119, at 649.   
126. BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE “TRUE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL” IN AMERICA 107–08 (1995) 
(describing the law profession’s rise to prominence after the American Civil War).   
127. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 472.   
128. Jeffrey D. Jackson, Socrates and Langdell in Legal Writing: Is the Socratic Method A 
Proper Tool for Legal Writing Courses?, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 267, 270 (2007) (discussing case method 
as a “furtherance” of Langdellian belief in law as science and as such the method’s analytic nature).   
129. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 53 (citing REED, supra note 73, at 376, 378) (“Although the 
case class (and the Socratic method) were ultimately to be justified under a different rationale, their 
original purpose was to isolate and analyze the relatively few principles of the common law that the 
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This is typically where the inductive reasoning takes place.  To glance even 
more narrowly into that inductive reasoning, the case method prompts students 
to render or intuit the results of cases by deciding categorically how similar or 
distinct they are to previous cases.130  Moreover, there is rational, left-brain 
logic in the endeavor, which adds to the abstraction.  Although the facts of cases 
might vary from dispute to dispute, one assumes under the Langdellian concept 
of law that the legal principles that guide the direction of cases are discoverable 
and unwavering and just.  Put in such terms, at times, there is a dispassionate 
feel to this inductive reasoning—not unlike “higher mathematics,” according to 
Lawrence Friedman.131  All in all, the “thinking” in “thinking like a lawyer,” as 
the case method’s use of the Socratic dialogue demonstrates, conveys the 
impression of a hermetic scientific method that discounts experimentation and 
experience as part of the scientific engagement, but one that favors studying 
legal concepts isolated in abstraction or in a vacuum.132  This emphasizes that 
the case method differentiated itself from the “text-book method” of law school 
instruction that was the fashion in American law schools prior to Langdell’s 
ascendancy at Harvard in the 1870s.133   
Another way that the phrase “thinking like a lawyer” reflects the case 
method pedagogy is in the way that the phrase case can conjure the concept of 
law as Langdell and the formalists envisioned.  The phrase reveals its 
Langdellian conception of legal science if one asks just exactly what that lawyer 
was supposed to “think” about at the inception of the case method at Harvard.  
The discovery of isolated legal concepts in Langdell’s inductive case method 
presumes that the inquiry leads to a complete and organic version of the 
common law, devoid of contextual variables; again, this impression exemplifies 
Langdell’s conception of law as science, a science that stems from universal 
 
Harvard system postulated and to show how some (presumably non-Harvard trained) judges had 
deviated from them.” (footnote omitted)).   
130. WEST, supra note 14, at 50 (discussing in law schools the prevalence of teaching “[t]he 
discernment of ‘likes’—the decision that this case is like that one, with which it shares some 
characteristics but not others, but not fundamentally like that one, with which it also might share some 
characteristics, but from which it is importantly distinguishable, and the identification of those relevant 
differences and similarities”).   
131. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 472.   
132. Id.  (“[Langdell’s] model of science was not experimental, or experiential; his model was 
Euclid’s geometry, not physics or biology.  Langdell considered law a pure, independent science; it 
was, he conceded, empirical; but the only data he allowed were reported cases.  If law is at all the 
product of society, then Langdell’s science of law was a geology without rocks, an astronomy without 
stars.  Lawyers and judges raised on the method, if they took their training at all seriously, came to 
speak of law mainly in terms of a dry, arid logic, divorced from society and life.”).   
133. See id. at 466–67.   
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principles evolved through time.134  But the way Langdell considered the law 
as science and the way he described it harbored inconsistencies on the surface.  
First, he treated the law as if it was not evolving—that by sifting and culling 
through cases like sediment, a universal truth of the law could be scientifically 
and archeologically uncovered.135  However, he also described how such 
common-law principles had evolved over time, for instance, in the way he 
organized cases chronologically in his contracts casebook to show a 
development.136  Perhaps in this culling between good and bad cases, the more 
lawyers have thought about principles over the centuries, the more we arrived 
at the truth of these legal principles.  Or perhaps the law never evolved; under 
a Langdellian, formalist sensibility, the law was always “there” in the natural 
world of cases, pre-dating humans in some mystical organic form, and merely 
waiting to be found for our judicial benefit137—or quite possibly the 
inconsistencies reveal some human sleight of hand.  Moreover, not only does 
this idea of the completeness of the law seem stagnant, if, in whatever way, the 
law has really ceased to evolve; but also in the ritualized dogmatic practice of 
the case method, it would add an autopsy feel to the whole study of case law.  
To Langdell, however, the completeness of the law did not indicate stagnancy; 
but rather the presumption and belief that law was complete signaled its 
autonomy.138  To Langdell, his observed scientific disposition of law suggested 
that law existed in nature apart from man, to be discovered, to be studied, but 
not to be augmented.139  Thus, it is tempting to make the metaphoric analogy 
that Langdell’s case method was like the attempt to find a natural resource, and 
once found, its application to existing and future legal problems was 
unadulterated.  In describing the importance of the law library, Langdell’s own 
words seem to allude to this:  
We have also constantly inculcated the idea that the library is 
the proper workshop of professors and students alike; that it is 
 
134. See id. at 473 (“The unity of some parts of the common law was a fact.  Langdell’s 
abstractions, however, ignored the nature of law as a living system, rooted in time, place, and 
circumstance.”).   
135. Id. at 472.   
136. Id. at 469.   
137. See Hoeflich, supra note 108, at 120.   
138. Rob Atkinson, Law as a Learned Profession: The Forgotten Mission Field of the 
Professionalism Movement, 52 S.C. L. REV. 621, 627 (2001) (noting that under Langdell’s conception 
of law was a direction toward “the way of law’s autonomy” and that “[l]aw, from this perspective, is 
an island complete unto itself”).  
139. See Hoeflich, supra note 108, at 120.   
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to us all that the laboratories of the university are to the 
chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history to the 
zoologists, the botanical garden to the botanists.140   
The law library was the laboratory and to find the law, we would go to its 
printed books.141  So there, law was a science.   
An important hidden assumption of Langdell’s conception of the law was 
its perceived perfection.  Buttressed by then-current values of objectivity and 
empiricism in the sciences, Langdell conceived of the law as “objective” and 
perfect as well.142  Of course, in this way, like the sciences, law deserved a place 
for true academic prestige and study at the university, away from the 
connotations of previous incarnations of American law schools that emphasized 
rote-memory and daily recitations on the law.143  The features of the 
Langdellian casebook exemplify this peculiar conception of law as this unique 
academic science.  The original casebooks assembled and used at Harvard 
during Langdell’s tenure were merely a collection of cases, without notes, and 
devoid of social or political contexts.144  The cases reflected the English 
common law tradition; for instance, most of the cases in Langdell’s contracts 
casebook were English cases while American cases were fewer and mostly 
from New York and Massachusetts courts.145  Of course, questions of true 
objectivity would arise to challenge Langdell’s assumptions in the canonical 
assembling of these cases for instruction, if they were to exemplify the perfect 
unity of the common law.  But for Langdell, the dogma of the common law 
would allow him to ignore that point; after all, even in the preface of his 
casebook, he defended his selection of cases by pointing to “good” and “bad” 
cases:  
[T]he cases which are useful and necessary for this purpose [of 
study] at the present day bear an exceedingly small proportion 
to all that have been reported.  The vast majority are useless 
and worse than useless for any purpose of systematic study.  
Moreover, the number of fundamental legal doctrines is much 
less than is commonly supposed; the many different guises in 
which the same doctrine is constantly making its appearance, 
 
140. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches (November 5, 1886), in 3 
LAW Q. REV., Jan. 1887, at 123–24. 
141. See id.   
142. See Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and 
Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REV. 353, 360 (1995).   
143. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 54, 61–63.   
144. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 469, 482.   
145. Id. at 469.   
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and the great extent to which legal treatises are a repetition of 
each other, being the cause of much misapprehension.146   
There is an almost Darwinian survival-of-the-fittest feeling here—as 
Langdell described the process of collecting these artifact cases in his book.147  
And it was Darwin’s scientific theory that promoted a sense of objectivity.148  
Like species being guided by an invisible hand toward survival in evolutionary 
biology, the “fittest” cases and legal principles survived in Langdell’s world of 
legal science to be refined by thinking academically about them.149  Other than 
the inclusion of good cases and the exclusion of bad ones, the process of finding 
such good cases in Langdell’s contracts casebook were divided and arranged 
topically, with cases in each topic presented in chronology, “showing an 
evolution of principles from darkness to light.”150  Moreover, no statutes were 
included in his casebook.151  With the casebook, students were to distill or find 
the legal principles contained in such cases and believe that such principles 
were fixed and able to resolve future cases.152  Thus, the form of the Langdellian 
casebook was mimetic of Langdell’s creed about the common law as science.  
The casebook was both self-contained and empirical in presentation, hermetic 
unto itself and steeped strictly in a near-exegetical tradition of the common 
law.153  All of these features of an untouchable perfection were the envisioned 
law to be “thought about” in “thinking like a lawyer.”   
   The more one examines the Langdellian case method in this partially 
destabilized and critical fashion, the more apparent that Langdell’s conception 
of “law as science” had some of the spirit of what law is—especially as 
embodied within the English common law tradition of law—but the conception 
 
146. LANGDELL, supra note 110, at vi–vii.   
147. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 55 (describing that the case method “was ‘scientific,’ 
practical, and somewhat Darwinian” and that “it managed to create an aura of the survival of the 
fittest”). 
148. Id.  (“[The case method] was based on the assumption of a unitary, principled system of 
objective doctrines that seemed or were made to seem to provide consistent responses.”).   
149. See Marcia Speziale, Langdell’s Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning of Anti-
Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. REV. 1, 29 (1980) (“Langdell’s return to original 
sources—the cases, his activization of the classroom, and his preference for principles over maxims 
parallel nineteenth-century empiricist and evolutionist thinking.”). 
150. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 469.   
151. Id.   
152. Weaver, supra note 89, at 528–29.   
153. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 472, 482.   
HO - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/17  2:46 PM 
154 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:131 
at times was also heavily and ironically artificial.154  The exclusion of certain 
cases in his teachings, cases of “local diversity” for instance, over English 
canonical cases, was motivated by aspirations of elevating legal studies as a 
unitary science across the United States.155  Accordingly, in assuming authority 
by presiding over the pedagogy and teaching methodology at Harvard in the 
1870s, Langdell was able to elevate himself and his formalist conception; in 
Lawrence Friedman’s words “[t]here was only one common law; Langdell was 
its prophet. . . . Oceans could not sever the unity of common law; it was one 
and indivisible . . . .”156  First was the sense of intellectual hierarchy that 
perpetuated itself; the common law was elevated and Langdell along with it.157  
Others have elaborated more functionally about Langdell’s sleight of hand, 
describing the results of situating himself at the head of this brand of formalism: 
“Langdell, the interpreter of the law, never let the reader know that it was he, 
rather than the ‘law,’ that created the discourse and conducted the analysis.”158  
Langdell’s conception reinforced a way to speak about the law that was 
detached from the subject in its formalism.159  Rather, perceiving law as science 
led to viewing and dissecting law in assumptions of completeness and in 
isolating abstraction.160  As a result, this formalist way of viewing the law bears 
a “hidden assumption of the autonomous [legal] subject,” which is theoretically 
problematic.161  Langdell’s formalism “proceeded as if law itself was speaking 
to the reader and hence capable of creating its own meaning.  ‘The law, like a 
subject, [did] things; doctrines [became] subjects, and [did] things to each 
other.’”162  That view was what law’s complete autonomy implied and was 
created by “the objectification of law” where “legal rules are explained, 
analyzed, and criticized as if they were transcendental objects unaffected by 
analyzing subjects.”163  In both method and content, Langdell’s “law as science” 
fetishized ways to view the law in perfected form and ignored “inconsistences” 
for an idealized perfection cast as scientific objectivity—even though it could 
 
154. See id. at 469–73.   
155. Id. at 472.   
156. Id.   
157. Id.   
158. Minda, supra note 142, at 381 (citing Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. 
L. REV. 1627, 1632 (1991)).   
159. See id. at 360.   
160. Id.   
161. Id. at 381.  “Once the subject is revealed and articulated, legal scholars are confronted with 
a serious predicament.”  Id. at 382.   
162. Id. at 381 (alterations in original) (quoting David S. Caudill, Pierre Schlag’s “The Problem 
with the Subject”: Law’s Need for an Analyst, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 707, 711 (1993)).  
163. Id. (using Langdell’s contract case book as an example).   
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not have been truly objective or scientific if one had to discover the law by 
looking selectively backward in time in “printed books.”164  Moreover, 
Langdell’s “law as science” was a science that ignored experimentation and 
context.165  It left the lawyer as an observer, detached from law’s evolution 
because the common law was no longer assumed to be evolving.  Accordingly, 
law was to be written about “in the passive voice” and to be “rigorously 
maintain[ed in] the detached demeanor of a scientist conducting a controlled 
experiment.”166  No subject existed, apart from the law itself, in the legal 
principles drawn from the opinions that Langdell and his students examined in 
Harvard law courses—despite these opinion’s judicial authorships.  Langdell’s 
own theory of the law—his own peculiar science—and methodology reveals 
that he was more or less an exegete.167  The law was perfect—or perfected in 
abstraction—and as a lawyer, one could only think within the restrictions of 
that perfection, not beyond.   
That was the dogma of Langdell’s legal science.  His conception of law was 
taught and perpetuated through its case method dissection of common law cases 
to students at Harvard and then nationally thereafter.  After World War I, 
numerous American law schools began to emerge, replicating the case method 
as American legal education’s conspicuous pedagogy in lecture halls 
throughout the United States.168  Accordingly, generations of American law 
 
164. See Wai Chee Dimock, Rules of Law, Laws of Science, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 203, 209–
10 (2001) (“Langdell’s scientific knowledge seems to have been quite perfunctory, oblivious not only 
to the historical challenge of science but also to the new developments taking place in the very century 
in which he was writing.”).   
165. Minda, supra note 142, at 381 (citing Schlag, supra note 158, at 1632–62) (“In Langdell’s 
contract casebook, for example, law is a transcendental object unaffected by social and economic 
context.”)); id. (“[A] debtor becomes personally bound to his creditor for the payment of the debt . . . .” 
(alterations in original) (quoting Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisprudence, 1 HARV. L. REV. 
55, 68 (1887))); id. (“The debtor and the creditor are unnamed individuals who are the legal 
abstractions of Langdell’s analysis of commercial law.”). 
166. Id. at 380.   
167. Kunal M. Parker, Representing Interdisciplinarity, 60 VILL. L. REV. 561, 563 (2015) 
(“‘Langdell’s legal science’ was ‘gendered and classed and raced, depending for its authority on 
removing contestation, the voices of others, from the text and hermeneutics of the law.’  Most law 
professors were male and thoroughly schooled in Langdellian science; they had no experience with 
rhetoric or history and therefore reinforced the Langdellian idea that law is doctrine.” (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Penelope Pether, Measured Judgments: Histories, Pedagogies, and the Possibility 
of Equity, 14 LAW & LITERATURE 489, 516–17 (2002))).   
168. Stephen R. Alton, Roll over Langdell, Tell Llewellyn the News: A Brief History of American 
Legal Education, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 339, 349–50 (2010). 
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students have “thought like lawyers” and objectified the law under Langdell’s 
conception of legal science.169   
B. The Neglect of Realism 
While the widespread use of the Langdellian case method was solidifying 
in American law schools in the 1920s and 1930s, legal realism came to 
dominate American legal thought.170  An earlier version of realism co-existed 
with the Langdellian formalists during the late nineteenth century, with Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., as one of its inspirational founding patriarchs.171  Holmes, 
who taught at Langdell’s Harvard during the 1870s, withheld the beliefs of 
formalism and did not share Langdell’s concept that the common law was 
unified and complete.172  Rather, Holmes’s concept of the common law 
embraced a “pragmatic historicism,” which relied on “experience as an 
objective source of knowledge.”173  History has paired Langdell and Holmes 
against each other, but the rise of their respective schools of legal thought was 
not simultaneous.  As Stephen Feldman has described, the realists followed the 
formalists in the period of legal modernism in American law, with Holmes’s 
ideas joined subsequently by the writings of Roscoe Pound and Benjamin 
Cardozo, and even later by the likes of Jerome Frank, Felix Cohen, and Karl 
Llewellyn.174   
The realists assailed against Langdell’s formalist conception of law as 
science.  Pound famously called Langdell’s formalism “mechanical 
jurisprudence.”175  On the whole, the realists “denounced the abstract and 
decontextualized rationalism of Langdellian legal science as unrelated to 
meaningful social reality, unrelated to human experiences of the external 
world.”176  They pointed out the fallacy of Langdell’s scientific objectivity: 
“Whereas Langdellian scholars claimed that their abstract reasoning enabled 
them to discover objective legal truths—the rules and principles of the common 
law—realists such as Felix Cohen belittled the Langdellian rules and principles 
 
169. See id. at 351.   
170. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO 
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 108–09 (2000).   
171. See Kimball, supra note 73, at 304–05.   
172. FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 108.   
173. Id.   
174. Id. at 108–11.   
175. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 607 (1908).   
176. FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 110.   
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as ‘transcendental nonsense.’”177  The realist movement took dominance of the 
high seas of American legal thought away from the Langdellian formalists, but 
from within the movement itself, there was a spectrum of disparity amongst its 
prominent thinkers.178  Still, the realist reaction against the Langdellian notion 
of unity and objectivity of law as science was undeniable.179  Ultimately, what 
the realists offered as a response to Langdellian formalism was to “cause[] the 
predicative value of doctrine to be seriously questioned.”180  They questioned 
and torpedoed Langdell’s objectivity until that objectivity was substantially 
submerged.181   
The realists did not exempt Langdellian innovations of the American law 
school from scrutiny.182  Jerome Frank famously made his views known that 
“[t]he law student should learn, while in school, the art of legal practice.  And 
to that end, the law schools should boldly, not slyly and evasively, repudiate 
the false dogmas of Langdell.”183  In a more hypothesized tone, Karl Llewellyn 
later expressed his views about the Langdellian dependence on appellate cases 
 
177. Id. at 110–11.  Feldman uses an example from Felix Cohen to further elaborate the realist 
philosophical differences: 
For instance, to determine whether a court has jurisdiction over a corporation, a 
Langdellian would ask, “Where is the corporation?”  The Langdellian then 
ostensibly would turn to abstract rules and principles to resolve this question—
concluding, let’s say, that the corporation is in New York. But Cohen argued that 
despite the Langdellians’ pretensions, their rules and principles would not 
produce a determinative outcome in this case.  “Clearly the question of where a 
corporation is, when it incorporates in one state and has agents transacting 
corporate business in another state, is not a question that can be answered by 
empirical observation,” Cohen wrote.  “It is in fact, a question identical in 
metaphysical status with the question . . . ‘How many angels can stand on a point 
of a needle?’”   
Id. at 111 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense 
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810 (1935)).   
178. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 156 (“The Realist ‘movement’ thus gave the impression of 
being more firmly established than in fact it was.  The distance between [Jerome] Frank at his most 
extreme and [Karl] Llewellyn at his most constructive could not have been greater.”).   
179. Id.  (“The major contribution of the Realist movement was to kill the Langdellian notion of 
law as an exact science, based on the objectivity of the black-letter rules.  When it became acceptable 
to write about the law as it actually operated, legal rules could no longer be assumed to be value-free.”).   
180. Id.   
181. See id.  (“The Realists went a long way toward killing the idea of ‘the system’ altogether.  
All legal logic came under suspicion.”).   
182. Id. (“[T]he value of [the Realists’] capacity to question accepted tenets of law and legal 
education cannot be denied.”).   
183. Jerome Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education?, 19 A.B.A. J. 723, 726 (1933).   
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by contrasting it with the case approach used in business schools: “Consider, 
for example, the possibility of building up our so-called cases out beyond the 
judicial opinion into something resembling the completeness of the cases 
gathered for the Harvard Business School.”184  In their own respective right, 
Frank and Llewellyn, as realists, both beckoned for the kind of practical training 
for lawyers that steered beyond Langdell’s case method.185  Yet, the questioning 
fell short of leading to deep and comprehensive changes in existing Langdellian 
legal pedagogy: “The criticism of the case method came under fire in the 1920s 
and 1930s from legal scholars of the Legal Realist movement, even while it 
continued as part of American law school training.”186  There were, of course, 
some noticeable modifications: the inclusion of clinical legal education and the 
contextualization of social sciences into the law school curriculum with new 
courses that were interdisciplinary.187  But heavy dependence on appellate 
opinions in law school classes persisted.188 The Socratic dialogue continued to 
be employed in lectures.189  In spite of adding supporting materials alongside 
cases in the law casebook,190 the core of the text was still comprised of topical 
collections of appellate case opinions.  Accordingly, “[d]espite the realist 
critique, the use of the case method as a pedagogical tool for developing 
exacting analyses of a legal problem continued to be used throughout the 
twentieth century and remains a part of law school instruction.”191   
Some irony exists in this neglect, particularly when one notes how the 
realists dominated over the American legal academy in the early decades of the 
twentieth century.  One would have believed that the realists’ disagreement 
with Langdell would have prompted some significant changes to Langdell’s 
case method pedagogy in American law teaching.  But at the core of realism, if 
the law was not Langdell’s Darwinian notion of science any longer, the law had 
become a social science.  Perhaps this transition was why law schools continued 
 
184. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 215 
(1948).   
185. See Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical 
Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577, 587–89 (1987).   
186. Susan Katcher, Legal Training in the United States: A Brief History, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
335, 367 (2006).   
187. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 158–60.   
188. Katcher, supra note 186, at 368.   
189. See STEVENS, supra note 85, at 157.   
190. GILMORE, supra note 84, at 88 (“What were called non-legal materials . . . became ‘Cases 
and Materials’ to indicate that studying law no longer meant studying cases which, according to 
Langdell, were our ‘experimental materials.’”).   
191. Katcher, supra note 186, at 368 (citing I THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES 24 (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999)).   
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to use the case method long after the age of American legal realism, even when 
other movements of legal thought emerged such as legal process in the 1950s,192 
and then in the 1970s and thereafter, schools such as law and economics, critical 
legal studies, feminist legal theory, law and literature, and critical race theory.193  
With the realists, law was not science, but social science.194  This 
conception embedded itself in the case method pedagogy, creating a neat 
retrofit to Langdell’s case method rather than a wholesale move to another 
entirely new instructional practice.  According to Friedman, “Langdell’s system 
was repackaged as a superior kind of skills training; . . . the method taught the 
student how to ‘think like a lawyer.’  This meant mastering the law school brand 
of mental acrobatics, along with the fine art of argument . . . .”195  Perhaps this 
lack of change reflects the limitation of realist conceptions of law from being 
totally and completely different from formalism.  In any event, as a result of 
this retrofit, the objectification of law that had underscored the practice of 
Langdell’s case method remained in some shape in later case method usage in 
law schools.196  Even past the last century, whether advertently or not, 
professors have instilled that objectification to students in their law classes, 
even though legal theorists no longer subscribe to Langdellian conceptions.197  
The form of the case method, as used in American law schools today, replicates 
the ceremony of objectification, even if law as science has been replaced by 
something else.198  The examination of law through the indoctrinated rituals of 
professorial questioning-and-answering, the perceived primacy of appellate 
case decisions, and the same line-up of subject courses in the first-year 
curriculum since Langdell’s Harvard days suggest that, devoid of the 
Langdellian scientific perspective of law, the remnant form of Langdell’s 
methodology might still be steering students and scholars toward a similar type 
of regard for the law.199  And all of this continuance of the case method has 
been the status quo for decades.200  In terms of pedagogy then, what American 
 
192. FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 120 (describing the rise of the legal process school in the 
1950s).   
193. See Minda, supra note 142, at 367.   
194. See Alton, supra note 168, at 356 (citing GILMORE, supra note 84, at 87).  Alton further 
states that, thanks to the realists, we also see law as an art.  Id. at 358.   
195. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 36 (2002).   
196. See id.   
197. See Minda, supra note 142, at 380–83.   
198. See id.   
199. WEST, supra note 14, at 43–48 (noting that law schools teach a “moral relativism”).   
200. Id. at 46.   
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law schools have been sailing on since the legal realists is the ghost ship of 
Langdell.   
In an existential observation about American law schools in the post-
Recession crisis, Robin West has suggested the cause and implications of the 
hesitancy to move beyond Langdell’s case method, despite modern rejections 
of Langdell’s conception of law:  
Contemporary law students are receiving the benefit of a 
belated recognition that in his desire to separate the study of 
law from the study of society Langdell was spectacularly 
wrong: law is not autonomous from other cultural, economic, 
historical, and philosophical forces, and should not be studied 
as such.  Today’s law students are the better for it; they have a 
more realistic, as well as far richer, understanding of law as a 
consequence than did their counterparts in Langdell’s 
classrooms.   
 Nevertheless, the added sophistication that comes from 
interdisciplinarity does not in any obvious or automatic way 
contribute to the articulation of what a lawyer is or should be, 
or what education a student should have to become one.  It does 
not, that is, fill the gap left by our rejection of the Langdellian 
understanding of the lawyer as a member of a learned 
profession immersed in the study of the common law.  We 
simply have not articulated such a post-Langdellian 
conception, and all the interdisciplinary studies in the world on 
the nature of law, rather than lawyering, will not imply one: we 
will not have one, that is, until we have a faculty committed to 
producing one, and acting on it.201   
West attributes the cause of this hesitancy to jump ship to some other vessel 
of teaching to a lack of faculty perspective collectively on the teaching of law 
students—a missing “post-Langdellian conception”202—and not an academic 
perspective of law’s nature, which as West criticizes is what students receive 
from modern law courses.203  The implication of hanging on to the traditions 
and practices of law teaching is how inappropriate or effective the current 
 
201. Id. at 154–55.   
202. See id.   
203. Id. at 155 (“Students learn law today not from the rarified perspective of the appellate 
lawyer, but rather, increasingly, from an academic perspective that is immersed in some aspect of the 
legal system but for essentially nonprofessional reasons, or from clinicians immersed in practice, but 
not from an idealized or particularly critical perspective.”). 
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conception is for training lawyers.204  In other instances, West has identified in 
her own words how the use of the case method leads to problematic 
objectifications of law, illustrating how the propagation of Langdell’s case 
method leads to legalism that distracts from serious engagement with the idea 
that law can further justice.205  Her arguments on whether or not law ought to 
further justice and how such notions should be taught to law students buttress 
her own specialized imperative that law schools must move toward a post-
Langdellian conception.206  Nevertheless, she is correct to diagnose that a post-
Langdellian conception is amiss in legal education even though more than a 
century of American legal history has passed since the decline of Langdell’s 
concept of law as science.   
Others have concurred with West.207  Part III will examine more 
implications of this incongruity between American legal pedagogy and history.   
III.  THE CASE METHOD & OBJECTIFICATION OF THE LAW 
In observing the historical movements of American jurisprudence, one need 
not search far and wide for criticisms that the nature of the law is ever slow-
moving in comparison to advances in social reality.  Such criticisms emerge 
rather easily after a cursory search.  Whether scholarly observations of lag and 
sluggishness have been used to describe progress of certain bodies of law208 or 
the entirety of jurisprudence itself,209 one consensus is that “the legal system 
was peculiarly slow to reflect changes in the larger culture, partly because of 
the specialized nature of the legal profession and partly because of the 
investment of professionals in the status quo.”210  Similarly, as law’s 
derivatives, the legal profession and legal education both embody comparable 
rhythms toward progress.211  Like progress in law, “[a]dmittedly, change often 
 
204. Id. at 154–55 (“Nevertheless, the added sophistication that comes from interdisciplinarity 
does not in any obvious or automatic way contribute to the articulation of what a lawyer is or should 
be, or what education a student should have to become one.”). 
205. Id. at 51, 57–59.   
206. Id. at 66.   
207. See Alton, supra note 168, at 363.   
208. See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 418 (2015) 
(remarking how “[c]hange in property law is slow”).   
209. See, e.g., Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 70 (2006).   
210. G. Edmund White, Transforming History in the Postmodern Era, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 
1323 n.21 (1993) (citing Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of 
Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967)).   
211. See Alton, supra note 168, at 361–62.   
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comes rather slowly to legal education; after all, the law has always tended to 
be a backward-looking profession.”212  Resistance is more often the norm. 213  
Conflated together, all of these remarks about the behavior of law and lawyers 
prompts one to ask in the context of the legal profession whether lawyers as 
pessimists tend to persist in orthodoxy more than they would if they were more 
collectively optimists.  
At first, Langdell’s reforms at Harvard Law School were not exempt from 
resisters.214  Early in his period of pedagogical innovations at Harvard, the 
introduction and use of the case method in the classroom met some staunch 
reluctance from both legal educators and the bar alike.215  The account in The 
Centennial History of Harvard Law School, which attributed the case method 
to Langdell, recounted that “[t]o most of the students, as well as to Langdell’s 
colleagues, [the case method] was [an] abomination.”216  More specifically, 
[h]is attempts were met with the open hostility, if not of the 
other instructors, certainly of the bulk of the students.  His first 
lectures were followed by impromptu indignation meetings—
“What do we care whether Myers agrees with the case, or what 
Fessenden thinks of the dissenting opinion?  What we want to 
know is: ‘What’s the law?’” 217   
The contemporary bar had its harsh skepticisms: “Practitioners had always 
had some doubts about the case method, both intellectually and politically.  As 
early as 1876 the Central Law Journal had condemned the system ‘which we 
understand to involve a wide and somewhat indiscriminate reading of cases—
some of them overruled.’”218  The editors of the Central Law Journal had 
expressly disclaimed any approval of the case method.219  They also noted how 
 
212. Id. at 361.   
213. See, e.g., JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS 13 (1914) (“Opposition to innovation is deeply rooted in human nature.”); 
see also White, supra note 210, 1323 n.21.  White points out that conversely to a steady adherence to 
status quo due to investment, there is threat to ideology that holds people back and impinges change; 
in other words, there is “the phenomenon of limits on the capacity of humans to embrace certain data 
within their consciousness—the ‘imprisoning’ features of ideology.  Changes in the larger culture may 
not be perceived by legal actors, given their consciousness, as ‘changes’ at all.”  Id.   
214. HARVARD LAW SCH. ASS’N, THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL: 
1817–1917, at 35 (1918).   
215. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 58.   
216. HARVARD LAW SCH. ASS’N, supra note 214, at 35.   
217. Id.   
218. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 57 (quoting The Higher Legal Education, 3 CENT. L.J. 539, 540 
(1876)).   
219. The Higher Legal Education, supra note 218, at 540 (“We do not wish to be understood as 
approving the system of teaching law introduced by Prof. Langdell . . . .”).   
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the rise of the case method pedagogy had “excited great and bitter controversy” 
that led to the establishment of the law school at Boston University.220  The 
allusion to a certain underlying concern or fear for how the profession might be 
perceived seemed to lurk beneath the surface of the Journal’s observations:  
The strength of our impressions is that the reading of carefully 
selected judgments of the courts, could, in a course of legal 
study, profitably be made subsidiary to the attending of 
lectures and the study of approved textbooks; but we doubt the 
wisdom of relying on case-reading to the extent to which, as 
we understand it, Prof. Langdell’s system goes.221   
This possible prediction that the law would be subjugated resembles the 
tension against the trade night-school law schools that sprang in the early 
twentieth century to accommodate ethnic minorities who wanted to attend law 
schools and enter into the profession but were more or less excluded from the 
learned classes at law schools such as Harvard.222  It seemed more politically 
motivated than accurate.  In fact, the trade school model was inconsistent with 
Langdell’s intentions for starting the use of the case method at Harvard; he had 
intended the case method to elevate the legal studies, not automatize it.223   
True to effect, however, the journal editors got it right that students would 
skip his classes.  In the first term of introducing the case method, Langdell’s 
“students were bewildered; they cut Langdell’s classes in droves; only a few 
remained to hear him out.”224  By the end, the class was left to seven students—
devotees who were then known as “Kit’s Freshmen” or “Langdell’s 
Freshman.”225  But students did not leave because they thought they could wing 
the learning of critical lawyering skills on their own.226  More likely Langdell’s 
 
220. Id.; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 470 (“The Boston University Law School was 
founded in 1872 as an alternative to Harvard’s insanity.”).   
221. The Higher Legal Education, supra note 218, at 540.   
222. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 39–40, 49 n.49, 100–02.   
223. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 472.  Friedman recounts that “Langdell’s proudest boast was 
that law was a science, and that his method was highly scientific.”  Id.  The scientific attributes ascribed 
to his method played into the tension of perceptions that legal education was either vocational or 
rigorous scholarly training.  In fact, within the history of American legal training, “[a] principle of 
vocational training struggled against a principle of scientific training.”  Id.  In this way, “Langdell’s 
new method was antivocational.”  Id. 
224. Id. at 470.   
225. Id.   
226. See id.   
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students left because they could not find the relevance of what Langdell taught 
through his case method—“overruled” decisions.   
Inadvertently or otherwise, Joseph Beale echoed this irrelevancy when he 
recounted that Langdell’s law “sometimes seemed too academic; and many of 
his students said, if they did not really feel, that his teaching was magnificent, 
but it was not law”227—particularly as Langdell called English cases by Lord 
Hardwick “comparatively recent” and “was believed to regard modern 
decisions as beneath his notice.”228  The peculiar academic nature of Langdell’s 
classroom teaching proved to be pedantic: “The dialogues in Langdell’s classes 
went slowly, and covered very little ground, compared to the lecture 
method.”229  As an immediate reaction, colleagues at Harvard returned to their 
previous methods of law teaching.230   
Of course, eventually, the case method became the status quo that the legal 
academy heavily invested in.231  In 1906, James Ames, dean of Harvard Law 
School from 1895 to 1910, and who has received some attribution regarding the 
popularizing of the case method, remarked that  
the most fruitful change of all was the revolution effected by 
Langdell in the mode of teaching and studying law,—a 
revolution now so complete that most persons hear with 
surprise that, when his ‘Cases on Contracts,’ was first used, his 
disciples were a mere handful and known as ‘Langdell’s 
freshmen,’ a name given as a term of reproach but received as 
a title of honor.232   
Ames had been one of those seven freshmen.233  Perhaps this artifact was truly 
why Ames was hyperbolic in sentiment when he paid Langdell his tributes in 
1906, upon Langdell’s death, by saying that “[i]n the last ten years [Langdell’s] 
 
227. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Professor Langdell—His Later Teaching Days, 20 HARV. L. REV. 9, 
10 (1906).   
228. Id.   
229. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 470.   
230. Id.  It is also interesting to note that a decade after the case method was instilled at Harvard, 
“Langdell’s personal mode of teaching changed.  With his eyesight rapidly deteriorating, he gave up 
Socratic questioning and began to lecture, imparting his own analysis of the cases that students were 
assigned to read.”  Kimball, supra note 73, at 294 (first citing Beale, supra note 227, at 9; and then 
citing Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Papers and Discussion Concerning the Redlich Report, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 
91, 106–07 (1916)).   
231. James Barr Ames, Professor Langdell—His Services to Legal Education, 20 HARV. L. REV. 
12, 13 (1906).   
232. Id.   
233. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 470.   
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method has conquered its way into a majority of American law schools”234 and 
that “it is a constant satisfaction that this man of genius was permitted to see 
his views dominating legal education throughout the United States.”235  But in 
terms of the case method, “the leading universities had ‘received the faith’ by 
1891,”236 and “[u]ltimately, every major and most minor law schools converted 
to case-books and the Socratic method.”237  In large part, the method’s success 
was due to a gradual ability for law schools aspiring for prominence in the 
university setting to use it to reflect conformance to a growing elitist trend that 
had started at Harvard.238   
To be sure, some have observed positive attributes and consequences for 
using the case method.  There were financial benefits and efficiencies.  As 
Robert Stevens has observed, “[t]he vast success of Langdell’s method enabled 
the establishment of a large-size class.”239  Specifically, under Langdell’s 
deanship at Harvard, the case method allowed a class of 75 students to be led 
by one faculty member: “Its Socratic aspect justified the abandonment of the 
recitation and the quiz, the ‘exercises’ used at good schools relying on the 
lecture method.”240  The economics established by this new faculty-student 
ratio meant less expensive courses to run at Harvard; indeed, “[a]ny educational 
program or innovation that allowed one man to teach even more students was 
not unwelcome to university administrators.  The ‘Harvard method of 
instruction’ meant that law schools could be self-supporting.”241  This self-
substance seemed attractive to law schools.   
In terms of pedagogical benefits, others have identified them in the case 
method as well.  Approached by the Carnegie Foundation in 1913 to evaluate 
 
234. Ames, supra note 231, at 13.   
235. Id.; see Kimball, supra note 73, at 293–94 (discussing the “revisionist” nature of the tributes 
to Langdell in 1906, following his death, especially in contrast to Ames’ works as dean of Harvard that 
maintained Langdell’s legacy).   
236. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 57.   
237. FRIEDMAN, supra note 91, at 471.   
238. STEVENS, supra note 85, at 63.  Stevens notes that the case method succeeded because of 
institutional elitism and the race to achieve academic status: “No doubt part of the method’s popularity 
was snobbism; once elite law schools had decided to approve of the system, those aspiring to be 
considered elite rapidly followed.”  Id.; see also id. at 60–63 (narrating the “Harvardiz[ing]” of law 
schools at various American universities such as Columbia, Northwestern, Chicago, Cincinnati, 
Wisconsin, Hastings, Yale, and Valparaiso). 
239. Id. at 63.   
240. Id.   
241. Id. (citation omitted).   
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the case method in American law schools, German law professor, Josef 
Redlich,242 wrote in his resulting report that the case method was more 
analytically demanding for the law student over the older textbook method:  
Consequently as the [case] method was developed, it laid the 
main emphasis upon precisely that aspect of the training which 
the older text-book school entirely neglected: the training of 
the student in intellectual independence, in individual thinking, 
in digging out the principles through penetrating analysis of the 
material found within separate cases: material which contains, 
all mixed in with one another, both the facts, as life creates 
them, which generate the law, and at the same time rules of the 
law itself, component parts of the general system.  In the fact 
that, as has been said before, it has actually accomplished this 
purpose, lies the great success of the case method.243   
Redlich also qualified his praise by noting his hesitancy with the case 
method’s embodiments of a scientific conception of law, calling the heavy 
analogy between law and science “inaccurate”244—and by regarding the nature 
of American law, as driven by common law practices, to have buoyed the case 
method’s success.245   
On similar evaluations of praise as Redlich, others have dived further into 
observations of the case method’s analytical demand.  Paul Carrington offered 
a catalogue of benefits that observed the case method’s capability to foster 
mental discipline and independent habits of learning the law;246 its development 
of lawyerly judgment;247 its helpful comprehension of common law 
 
242. Kimball, supra note 73, at 290.   
243. REDLICH, supra note 213, at 39.   
244. Id. at 55.  In his view, Redlich found that “the analogy between legal science and physical 
science so frequently drawn by modern American lawyers in their discussions of method is, in 
everything that concerns nature and method, itself inaccurate.”  Id.  This had implications for the case 
method’s “unqualified rejection of the lecture from the curriculum of the university law schools, and 
the extraordinary slighting of literary aids to the study of law,” as it “seems an error and a prejudice 
which has its origin in an undoubted exaggeration of the value of the analytic method in and for itself; 
and possibly also in an exaggeration of the value in scientific instruction of ‘method’ in general.”  Id. 
at 54; see also id. at 55 (“Prominent though experimental and inductive methods are in the sciences 
which serve physical research, we press a generalization much too far when we make of the inductive 
method the sole criterion of scientific intellectual activity.”).   
245. Id. at 35 (“I said, further, that the fundamental reason for [the case method’s] success is to 
be found in the present condition of American law, and within this especially in the unshaken authority 
of the common law.  Unchecked by the voluminous output of statutory law, in all conceivable fields 
of law and in all the states of the Union, the law of America has still remained, above all things, 
common law.”).   
246. Paul D. Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 691, 745–46 (1995).   
247. Id. at 747.   
HO - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/17  2:46 PM 
2017] LAW AS INSTRUMENTALITY 167 
 
 
traditions;248 its promotion of moral consciousness;249 and its narrative power 
to draw attention.250  In commenting about Carrington’s indicated list of 
benefits, Judith Welch Wegner has questioned “whether these benefits are 
directly attributable to the ‘case method’ or to the use of the ‘Socratic method’ 
of questioning in conjunction with the study of cases.”251  Regardless of this 
distinction, Welch then considered that “other benefits might be added” to 
Carrington’s list: 
the potential for development of “deep knowledge,” the chance 
to participate in the “construction” of knowledge that fosters 
memory and self-confidence, the opportunity to teach about the 
legal process and lawyering as well as about how to read cases 
and engage in critical analysis, the power of learning in an 
authentic context that resembles at least to some degree the 
actual practice setting, and the educational force of gaining 
certainty in the face of pre-existing doubt.252   
In likewise fashion, Russell Weaver has also noted how the heavy emphasis 
of cases factually contextualizes the legal situations for students and can 
“stimulate greater student interest” than reading summaries of legal issues from 
a textbook.253  Similar to Carrington, Weaver also noted how the case method 
teaches students how to dissect the different parts of a case opinion,254 facilitates 
learning of critical analysis by compelling in-class inquiry into cases,255 
develops mental “toughness” and quick thinking skills,256 allows learning law 
in a precedent-driven system,257 imparts comprehension of a legal process that 
is inductive,258 and instructs upon the functions of a lawyer.259  Others have 
 
248. Id. at 749–54.   
249. Id. at 754–59.   
250. Id. at 746.   
251. Judith Welch Wegner, Reframing Legal Education’s “Wicked Problems,” 61 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 867, 927 (2009).   
252. Id.   
253. Weaver, supra note 89, at 547–48; see also David D. Garner, Comment, The Continuing 
Vitality of the Case Method in the Twenty-First Century, 2000 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 307, 328 (2000). 
254. Weaver, supra note 89, at 549.   
255. Id. at 549–52.   
256. Id. at 552–53.   
257. Id. at 553.   
258. Id. at 553–57.   
259. Id. at 558–61.   
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echoed Carrington, Welch, and Weaver’s emphases that the case method 
promotes critical and intellectual rigor.260   
Of course, opposing views about the method also exist—and in plenty of 
forms.  Specific criticisms, particularly from law faculty, over the pedagogical 
side effects of Langdell’s case method have always persisted—criticisms that 
echo the contemporary scrutiny of the method during Langdell’s days at 
Harvard, but also ones that dip deeper into its murky waters to uncover more of 
its shortcomings and treachery.  Never mind Jerome Frank’s unflattering 
criticisms about the case method in the 1930s, which asserted inter alia, that 
under the case method, students “do not study cases” truly as the method had 
claimed;261 that “[s]tudents trained under the Langdell system are like future 
horticulturists confining their studies to cut flowers”;262 and that the method’s 
most profound “fault is in its naive assumption of the inviolability of the stare 
decisis doctrine and its corollaries.”263  Or one could forgo for now, Grant 
Gilmore’s later acerbic indictments in the 1970s, which noted that “[a]t least in 
Langdell’s version, [the case method] had nothing whatever to do with getting 
students to think for themselves; it was, on the contrary, a method of 
indoctrination through brainwashing.”264  In tone, both Frank and Gilmore’s 
twentieth-century remarks seemed to rail against the widespread acceptance of 
the case method, trying to arouse mutiny in the academy by flinging contempt 
for Langdell and his method into the air.  And according to John Schlegel’s 
passing quip, uncovered in Bruce Kimball’s relatively recent historiography on 
Christopher Langdell, Grant Gilmore might have succeeded.265  But aside from 
Frank, Gilmore, and the trashing of the Langdellian method for the sake of 
mutiny (or even just the sake of trashing it), the crux of some of the negative 
insights toward the Langdellian case method points to its categorical failing to 
teach law in its entirety—that the pedagogy is propped with the purpose to 
 
260. See Garner, supra note 253, at 328–29 (asserting that the case method makes students self-
sufficient and teaches about the law’s complexity).   
261. Frank, supra note 81, at 910.   
262. Id. at 912.   
263. Id.  It could be worse: “They resemble prospective dog breeders who never see anything 
but stuffed dogs.”  Id.   
264. GILMORE, supra note 82, at 13.   
265. See Bruce A. Kimball, “Warn Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which They 
Are Not to Take As Law”: The Inception of Case Method Teaching in the Classrooms of the Early C. 
C. Langdell, 1870–1883, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 57, 60 (1999) (noting that John Henry Schlegel’s 
mentioning some of the reverent considerations for Langdell’s “golden age” for American law teaching 
might have ended when Grant Gilmore “started several of us off trashing it” (quoting Schlegel, supra 
note 86, at 369)).  
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accomplish too much, and as a result, has assumed too much.266  Redlich 
alluded to this problem when he wrote that a result of the case method as the 
dominant way of teaching law in American law schools is that “the students 
never obtain a general picture of the law as a whole, not even a picture which 
includes only its main features.”267  The teaching of principles and doctrines 
under common law through the case method was “being most excellently 
performed” at the law schools that Redlich observed, but that did not mean, in 
his opinion, that instruction on other traditions and points of the law were being 
accomplished.268  Grant Gilmore, aside from tone, made a similar statement that 
the case method’s effect was a type of suppression of the actual state and history 
of the law:  
Since 1800 the principal characteristics of American law had 
been its chaotic diversity, its sensitivity to changing conditions, 
its fluidity, its pluralism.  All that had to be suppressed. . . .  It 
is also fair to say that the Langdellians, both in their casebooks 
and their treatises, performed major surgery on what their 
chosen English cases had been about when they were real cases 
in a real England.  England became our never-never land, our 
Shangri-La, our Utopia.269   
 
266. See, e.g., W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1, 84 (1997) (noting 
Edward Phelps’ complaint that “the case method ‘attempt[s] too much’ for the time available and the 
capacity of the average student and that ‘[t]o plunge a student into this chaos [of cases], with his powers 
untried and imperfect, and his knowledge of principles incomplete, to grope his way through it as best 
he may, and to triangulate from case to case, supposing that he is getting forward when he is only going 
astray, is not to educate him, but tends rather to make him proof against education’” (alterations in 
original) (quoting Edward J. Phelps, Methods of Legal Education, 1 YALE. L.J. 139, 140–41 (1892))). 
267. REDLICH, supra note 213, at 41.   
268. See id. at 43 (“But here, also, it seems to me that the historical scaffolding of the English 
common law, as a general introduction to the analytical study of Anglo-American law, is extremely 
desirable and of the greatest importance.  A scientifically constructed survey of the main sources of 
the common law and of their relation to one another; of the concepts of customary and positive law; a 
short external history of the law, which should include the origin and development of the English courts 
of justice; a brief exposition and development of the nature and extent of the concept of equity; a 
description of that institution so important for Anglo-American law, the Reports, and of the concept of 
precedent; finally also a glance at the phenomenon of statutory law (legislation) and its nature and 
forms; all these things and much else connected with them ought to be furnished the students at the 
beginning of their studies, before their introduction to the analytical study of the cases.  The fact that 
this ground can be covered only in elementary and summary fashion need not prevent the presentation 
from being thorough and scientific.”).   
269. GILMORE, supra note 84, at 48 (footnote omitted).   
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Law was a distortion and the method reflected this distortion—a method 
that was then used to teach law in American law schools.  Therein the ironies 
of a presumed completeness, unity, and autonomy in a method with 
shortcomings emerge.   
Three decades ago, Duncan Kennedy explored the social and political 
ramifications of that distortion on American law students.270  In his memorable 
crit-laden fashion, Kennedy claimed how law school itself is an ideology, a 
sentiment that implies his views on the distortion of law, which made clearer 
sense when he unpacked the consequences of seeing that ideology for what it 
was: 
To say that law school is ideological is to say that what 
teachers teach along with basic skills is wrong, is nonsense 
about what law is and how it works; that the message about the 
nature of legal competence, and its distribution among 
students, is wrong, is nonsense; that the ideas about the 
possibilities of life as a lawyer that students pick up from legal 
education are wrong, are nonsense.271   
Seemingly echoing Gilmore’s claim of “indoctrination by brainwashing” 
but going even deeper, Kennedy illustrated how the distortion had been 
embedded as the status quo of American law schools and its ensuing effects on 
law students: 
Because students believe what they are told, explicitly and 
implicitly, about the world they are entering, they behave in 
ways that fulfill the prophecies the system makes about them 
and about that world.  This is the linkback that completes the 
system: students do more than accept the way things are, and 
ideology does more than damp opposition.272   
Kennedy’s reflections on the distortion of law were just as scathing as 
Gilmore’s; for instance, the Socratic dialogue was characterized as 
“pseudoparticipation.”273  But his lengthier ruminations drew out more clearly 
than Gilmore the distortion’s profound potency and harm.  From an 
examination of what takes place in the typical Socratic dialogue, “[i]t quickly 
emerges that neither the students nor the faculty are as homogeneous as they at 
first appeared.”274  That striation, undemocratic at its core in Kennedy’s 
 
270. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF 
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 54, 54–75 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).   
271. Id. at 54.   
272. Id.; GILMORE, supra note 82, at 13.   
273. Kennedy, supra note 270, at 56.   
274. Id.   
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description, appears as ominous and tense as those moments in a horror flick 
when recent converts to a destructive cult recognizes that they’ve been had—
and not in a good way.  But in Kennedy’s version, the converts continue to 
perpetuate the hierarchy; they continue the path of becoming lawyers, up the 
ranks of profession to eventually steer the industry and field.275   
Simultaneously, Kennedy criticized the case method for falsifying both the 
intellectualism of the law and the practice of lawyering.276  As for how the case 
method presented intellectualism of the law, Kennedy found it to be 
underwhelming: “The actual intellectual content of the law seems to consist of 
learning rules—what they are and why they have to be the way they are—while 
rooting for the occasional judge who seems willing to make them marginally 
more humane.”277  Was that all there was to the law—just these rules, likely 
from cases, and some hope for a meager judicial morality?  Kennedy’s 
reference to Langdell’s inductive legal science here is glaring.  Yet, the case 
method distorts more than that—particularly in regard to lawyering.  Skills are 
taught under the case method, but taught in a twisted “mystified” way that 
obscures what skills and lawyering are.  Like others before him, Kennedy 
contended that the case method substituted notions of lawyering wholesale with 
the false primacy of inductive legal reasoning by noting how under the case 
method, “law emerges from a rigorous analytical procedure called legal 
reasoning”278—one “which is unintelligible to the layperson but somehow both 
explains and validates the great majority of the rules in force in our system.”279  
His remark here connected the proverbial “thinking like a lawyer” (legal 
reasoning) with the idea of law’s completion (Langdell’s formalism), and 
served up an underhanded swipe at the case method’s inductive reasoning.  
Then he attacked the content of law courses.  Specifically, he noted how the 
law courses segregated each legal doctrine issue into “a tub on its own bottom,” 
which misled students from learning “an integrating vision of what law is, how 
it works, or how it might be changed (other than in any incremental, case-by-
case, reformist way).”280  That isolation parallels the isolation between legal 
reasoning and lawyering that Kennedy found was what law schools perpetrated, 
again distorting what law and lawyering was: “‘Legal reasoning’ is sharply 
 
275. Id. at 72.   
276. Id. at 59–60.   
277. Id. at 57.   
278. Id. at 59.   
279. Id.   
280. Id.   
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distinguished from law practice, and one learns nothing about practice.”281  The 
consequence ultimately “disables” students from the profession.282   
The curricular holdovers from Langdell also perturbed Kennedy.  
Recapitulating on the “tubs on their own bottoms” motif, Kennedy criticized 
the segregation of law courses, particularly in the first-year curriculum, as a 
deliberate, intentional set of separations283 that distorted the reality of law.284  
He observed that “peripheral subjects,” such as philosophy of law, history of 
law, legal process, and law clinical courses, that give context to the law were 
not readily taught as part of the core curriculum because law schools, preferring 
inductive reasoning, perceived these other courses as not promoting the “‘hard’ 
objective, serious, rigorous analytic core of law.”285  Instead, law schools 
trivialized these contextual courses as more or less cosmetic, part of the 
“finishing school for learning the social art of self-presentation as a lawyer.”286  
In this respect, Kennedy here seemed to echo Redlich’s hesitancy more than a 
half-century earlier in regards to the case method’s heavy emphasis of 
analytical rigor over teaching the context of law—except unlike Redlich, who 
was a German outside observer hired by the Carnegie Foundation, Kennedy 
was observing as an insider, from within the American legal academy (Harvard, 
no less), long after Langdell’s case method had become the status quo.287   
Kennedy lamented for an alternative: “A more rational system would 
emphasize the way to learn law rather than rules, and skills rather than answers.  
Student capacities would be more equal as a result, but students would also be 
radically more flexible in what they could do in practice.”288  He hinted at how 
the distortion of law through the case method achieved disparity in the way the 
Langdellian set-up in law schools created a setting for “enforced cultural 
uniformity.”289  If the analytical, inductive rigor of “thinking like a lawyer” has 
been the categorical substitute or proxy for what the law was or what lawyers 
did—or at least how law schools have used it since Langdell—and if the reason 
for inductive reasoning relied on Langdell’s original beliefs in the 
 
281. Id. at 60.   
282. Id.   
283. Id. at 59–61 (“The curriculum as a whole has a rather similar structure . . . ad hoc.”).   
284. Id. at 61 (“Entering students just don’t know enough to figure out where the teacher is 
fudging, misrepresenting, or otherwise distorting legal thinking and legal reality.”).   
285. Id. at 61.   
286. Id.   
287. Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 408 n.53 (1971); 
Dean H.F. Stone, Papers and Discussion Concerning the Redlich Report, supra note 230, at 91.   
288. Kennedy, supra note 270, at 65.   
289. Id. at 69.   
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completeness, unity, and autonomy of the common law, then the idea of what 
was law and how to uncover and study it under the case method was like what 
Redlich had said: inaccurate.  A more “realistic” idea of law has been siphoned 
off only to be reflected by a peculiarly small and limited set of behaviors that 
served to reinforce a distorted idea of the norm.290  The cultural implications 
were significant here as Kennedy illustrated how that small set of behaviors end 
up fetishized at the top of a hierarchy that appeared oppressive, especially to 
diverse law students.291  What the case method did with its distortion of law 
was to develop in law students “skills that incapacitate rather than empower, 
skills that will help you imprison yourself in practice.”292 The minority law 
student learned that the skill of assimilation was the oar of survival.293  
Meanwhile, everyone who entered the system “accept[ed] the system’s 
presentation of itself as largely neutral, as apolitical, meritocratic, instrumental, 
a matter of craft,” even though the reality of law was not that way.294  Not only 
was the outcome a grim one for legal education as the pedagogy installed as the 
status quo was based on a distortion of law, but what was worse in Kennedy’s 
view was that it fostered dispassion, detachment, disengagement, and 
disenchantment with the law.295   
Kennedy is not alone in being political and socially critical of the case 
method.  Commentators have also attacked the case method’s blindness toward 
a plurality of learning styles and capacities in students.296  Accordingly, in this 
vein, some have also emphasized how the case method fetishizes abstract 
reasoning over a more inclusive set of critical lawyering skills.297  Others have 
examined the psychological aspects of the case method and even unflatteringly 
 
290. See id. at 68.   
291. See id. at 70.   
292. Id.   
293. See, e.g., id. (“Lower-middle-class students learn not to wear an undershirt that shows, and 
that certain patterns and fabrics in clothes will stigmatize them no matter what their grades.  Black 
students learn without surprise that the bar will have its own peculiar forms of racism, and that their 
very presence means affirmative action, unless it means ‘he would have made it even without 
affirmative action.’”).   
294. Id. at 72.   
295. See id. at 73 (referring to a “private self” that students create).   
296. See Paul F. Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case Against the Case 
System?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 185 (1986) (asserting that the case method fails to account for 
“individualized learning styles and capacities”).   
297. See, e.g., Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law 
School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 449 (1996).   
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portrayed aspects of it as “infantilizing, demeaning, dehumanizing, sadistic, a 
tactic for promoting hostility and competition among students, self-serving, and 
destructive of positive ideological values.”298  Scholars have also observed that 
the way law schools teach the law exalts cold, hard doctrine over the “human 
aspects of lawyering—variously called empathetic, affective, feeling, altruistic, 
and service aspects of lawyering.”299 Even more incisively, other scholars have 
bemoaned that the case method’s sole weight on appellate opinions obscures 
the importance of doctrinal analysis to the exclusion of fact analysis in law 
practice, which can arguably shift the emphasis away from the doctrine.300 
In her existential assessment of law schools, Robin West sees the case 
method’s distortion-dispassion correlation as harboring serious implications for 
teaching justice in law schools.  West differs from others who link the case 
method to amoralism.301  Instead, she finds that contemporary American legal 
education produces a legalist way of engaging in the law that is due to the sense 
of processual fairness students pick up in case method reasoning starting in the 
first year and in the method’s preference for performing horizontal equity, of 
treating like cases alike.302  Again, the case method’s artificial and distorted 
placement of analytical rigor as superior lies at the heart of this conditioning of 
law students.  Coupled with the legacy of Langdellian formalism that still 
remains, the result, as West maintains, marginalizes the thoughts and teachings 
on justice, which bodes terribly for instilling a normative sense of jurisprudence 
in law students.303   
These scholarly and critical observations about the case method largely 
target the distortion of law behind the method.  It has not been hard for scholars 
to surmise that behind the distortion reflected in the case method rests the 
mandate of Langdellian nineteenth-century formalism to objectify law, 
according to its late nineteenth-century virtues.304  To see larger, more 
damaging implications in that objectification of law, postmodernist critiques of 
Langdellian formalism offer such implications for contemporary legal 
 
298. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, supra note 287, at 407.   
299. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap By Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing 
From the MacCrate Report–Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 
593, 595–96 (1994) (footnotes omitted).   
300. Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Advocating a Common 
Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707, 722 (1996).   
301. WEST, supra note 14, at 56.   
302. Id. at 51–52, 56.   
303. Id. at 88.   
304. See id. at 101–02.   
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education that are even more basic and fundamental than the disconnect 
between teaching law and justice that West had indicated.305 
As a tradition or mode of analysis concerned with and effected by questions 
of instability, postmodern experiences of the law have challenged modernist 
conceptions of law for embedded assumptions and establishments of objective 
and complete unity in the law as part of the project of legal modernists to find 
objective truth in reality.306  In this way, juxtaposition of Langdellian formalism 
and postmodernism allows us to see—from a phenomenological way, and even 
perhaps in an exaggerated way—the trappings of the conception of law as 
science: “What postmodernists do is intensify dissatisfaction with the 
narrowness of professional knowledge about law.”307  Specifically, postmodern 
jurisprudence’s obsession with the politics of form and the concept of the 
subjective in law has much to say about Langdellian formalism.308  While 
Langdell’s formalism perpetuated certain ideals about law—its completeness, 
autonomy, neutrality, etc.—and reinforced those ideals through its form—the 
case method—to the point of objectifying the law as its own living, breathing 
entity, postmodernism critiques the gaps in that endeavor, noting that, 
underneath the sorcery, the ideals and norms are never that neutral, complete, 
or objective.309 
Most notably, the politics of form and the concept of subjectivity in 
postmodern legal thought has focused on the missing subject in Langdellian 
conception of law and its associated problems.310  According to postmodernist 
thought, Langdell’s legal conception of law as science objectified law in a way 
that hid its first human author, Langdell, and its subsequent authors as well.311  
 
305. See id. at 27, 105–06.   
306. Minda, supra note 142, at 354.   
307. See id. (“Until recently, legal theorists were unaware of the influence of legal modernism.  
Indeed, legal thinkers did not become aware of the existence of legal modernism until a rival 
perspective, postmodernism, appeared in the legal academy and challenged the visions, ideas, and 
practices of modern legal thinkers.”).   
308. See id. at 374.   
309. See WEST, supra note 14, at 70–71, 71 n.70; Pierre Schlag, “Le Hors de Texte, C’est Moi”: 
The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631, 1637 
(1990); Minda, supra note 142, at 354.   
310. See Schlag, supra note 158, at 1632–34, 1637.   
311. See id. at 1646 (“Recall that the occasion for conceiving Langdellian formalism as grounded 
in a transcendental order of the object was the almost invariable effacement of the individual subject 
(e.g., ‘Chris Langdell’) whenever he spoke of law.”); see also id. at 1637 (quoting 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, 
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 39 (2d ed. 1935) (“It is assumed by most authorities that if the 
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As Pierre Schlag has observed, much of this veiling or “effacement” of the 
author was effectuated through ritualized rhetoric of the law as well as the act 
of inductive legal reasoning.312  Taking his contracts casebook as a prime 
example, Schlag notes how Langdell interchanges authorial viewpoints 
depending on whether he was writing about the law or whether he was writing 
about pedagogy:  
[W]henever Chris [Langdell] addresses a matter of pedagogy 
in his preface, the “I” is all over the place.  And yet, quite 
mysteriously, as soon as the law makes its appearance in the 
preface, the “I” vanishes.  Chris disappears.  Dean Langdell is 
removed.  Even you, the reader, begin to experience a certain 
ego loss.  Could it be God?  Is it love?  No, it’s law—law and 
science: ‘Law, considered as a science, consists of certain 
principles or doctrines.’313   
Ritualized and repeated in this way, the law as voiced and written by 
Langdellian formalists loses its authors and instead the impression is that 
“[c]ontract law does things; the rules speak, the doctrine evolves and develops” 
and “[m]odern legal scholars have since followed Langdell’s example; accounts 
of the subject are rare in contemporary legal scholarship because subjectivity is 
sublimated in legal forms and because only certain kinds of subjects can be 
vested in these legal forms.”314  As Gary Minda seems to suggest, the 
Langdellian vision of legal science encouraged this mimicry—“to write in the 
passive voice and to rigorously maintain the detached demeanor of a scientist 
conducting a controlled experiment”315—which has resulted in experiences of 
the law by modern legal scholars that have been “somehow ‘constrained’ and 
‘bounded’ by law’s professional method of analysis and orientation.”316  What 
is worse is the myth of disengagement: “And, yet, in removing their subjective 
presence from their discussion of the law, modern legal scholars have also 
assumed that they are capable of excluding their own personal subjective 
identities from their work.”317  They “assume, in other words, that they are 
becoming relatively empty, abstract, and universal subjects-in-control of the 
 
judges did not make, but discovered the law, then in the absence of legislation the law must remain 
what it has always been, and therefore by a process of backward projection, it is argued that unless the 
courts changed the law the law must have been the same in 1200 that it is today.” (emphasis added))). 
312. Id. at 1646–56.   
313. Id. at 1633–34 (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (citing KENNETH BURKE, 
A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 355 (1945); and then quoting LANGDELL, supra note 110, at vi). 
314. Minda, supra note 142, at 380.   
315. Id.   
316. Id.   
317. Id. at 380–81.   
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law.”318  The problem with this ritualized uniformity and passivity that tries to 
mimic the scientific, as Minda implies, is that all of this falsity, pretense, and 
subordination trickles down to professional inculcation, which is what law 
schools are tasked to do: “Hence, the expression ‘thinking like a lawyer’ makes 
sense because it is thought that all lawyers think alike.’”319   
The established ritual of rhetoric in legal reasoning not only subordinates 
its subjects but also its act of concealing through language and the 
overshadowing of subjects by the objectification of law makes any inquiries 
about that author difficult to achieve.  Here is how that emphasis of inductive 
legal reasoning creates this hermetic problem as it contributes to the 
objectification of law and at the same time minimizes the subject: “[L]egal rules 
are explained, analyzed, and criticized as if they were transcendental objects 
unaffected by analyzing subjects.”320  These attributes of rhetoric and reasoning 
under Langdell is the crux of a popularized formalist style.321  In this way, the 
law achieves objectification because “the law is a transcendental object 
unaffected by social and economic context”322 and the result is prevention 
“from confronting the hidden assumption of the autonomous legal subject.”323   
But postmodernism has recontextualized the subject in law as anything but 
an autonomous being.  A “serious predicament” for legal scholars is revealing 
that “the subject is a problem” because “[t]here are many different subjects who 
interpret the law.”324  How does one justify the law as transcendental, neutral, 
complete, and autonomous when “the meaning of law depends on the various 
constructions of different subjects”?325  The identities of the “subjects-in-
control of the law” matter.326  The revelation that law is “man-made”—not its 
own living scientific entity that reflects universal truths of the world—reflects 
humanity (and undoubtedly has reflected a certain kind of humanity, even under 
 
318. Id. at 381.   
319. See id.   
320. Id.   
321. Id.   
322. Id.   
323. Id.   
324. Id. at 382.   
325. Id.   
326. Id. at 381.   
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Langdell’s order).327  Meanwhile, we lack a language to articulate the law in 
this way, or reference points for this more realistic or truthful point of view 
about law.  This predicament is debilitating for legal scholars because it makes 
them confront subjectivity.  Likewise, as the politics of form and subordination 
of the self/subject is reflected in the case method through the same rhetoric and 
legal reasoning, the predicament is also debilitating—or couched in Duncan 
Kennedy’s terms, disabling—because in its continued use of the case method 
with its objectification and distortions of law, law schools pass these same 
problems of the subject in law to their students.328   
This postmodern critique suggests that Langdell’s dispassionate, 
disengaged version of law and the case method subverts the human in law by 
concealing subjectivity through its rhetoric and formalist style and emphasizing 
an idealized, legalistic objectivity.  The lack of focus on the subject—in the 
context of law school students—and the myth that the subject does not exist has 
serious ramifications.  “Langdellian formalism reduces the subject to a 
subordinate, trivial role, the performance of that trivial role remains essential to 
the ‘reading’ of the object order of law.”329  If that is the case, then American 
legal education is an ineffectual life raft floating on waters now revealed to be 
deeper and more treacherous than we have known.  Its methodology is 
irrelevant and disempowering.   
Yet, even with such postmodernist commentary nearly two decades ago, 
American law schools continue to rely on Langdellian pedagogy.330  Since even 
the realists, the academy has long-recognized the Langdellian conception of 
law as science as having some virtues but altogether unencompassing as a way 
to study and develop law,331 yet still the shell of the case method traps law 
schools from progressing forward.   
Prior to the recent crisis of legal education, Edward Rubin, in a critical 
stance against the Langdellian case method, hypothesized reasons why the case 
method still persisted in law schools, despite its outdatedness.332  He argues that 
the case method’s “very obsolescence” had engendered an appearance of its 
“immutab[ility]” so hard that “it seems less a tradition than a fact of nature.”333  
 
327. Id. at 382 (“This inquiry can be threatening and, indeed, frightening to many contemporary 
legal thinkers because it potentially exposes how legal codes, texts, professional habits, and grammar 
constitute subjectivity in the law.”).   
328. See generally Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1681, 1683–86 (1996).   
329. Schlag, supra note 158, at 1637.   
330. See Rubin, supra note 119, at 642.   
331. Id. at 635–36.   
332. Id. at 613–15.   
333. Id. at 613–14. 
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First, the boat seems hard to rock.  Additionally, Rubin observed that the 
complacency created by the fiscal powerhouses of law schools as money 
makers for universities and law faculty members as beneficiaries reduce any 
competing urge to change the status quo.334  Now there’s reluctance to rock the 
boat.  And finally, Rubin offers one more reason that law schools have kept the 
case method, which in part is self-defeating: faculty members at law schools 
tend to read “a false appearance of modernity” into the case method.335  In 
staying on the boat and not rocking it, we tell ourselves that the boat is truly 
state-of-the-art in order to justify continual refrain from rocking the boat.  
Moreover, “[o]ur failure to progress paints the Langdellian original with false 
colors of modernity, misleading us into thinking that the rationales for his 
curriculum correspond to our current understanding of law, society, and 
education.”336   
Ten years have passed since Rubin’s observations.337  At least one of his 
proffered justifications—the fiscal health and financial stability of law 
schools—is no longer quite the case because of the current and recent crisis of 
legal education.338  They are, borrowing another of Duncan Kennedy’s phrases, 
quite the fiscal “tubs on their own bottoms” as they might have been.339  With 
that prong no longer true, justification for keeping the case method afloat in 
contemporary American law schools seems even more uncertain—especially if 
the only reasons are the first and third ones that Rubin mentioned.  In an updated 
but still critical view about the future of legal education in 2014, Rubin has 
given two trends in society that may propel changes in legal education whether 
law schools like it or not.340  First is the rise of a knowledge-based economy, in 
which “the increasing complexity of society in general” and “legal expertise, as 
knowledge, is more central to the sources of wealth in that new economy,” will 
require a restructuring of law schools that may include additional years and 
intensity of instruction.341  Currently, because law schools still “retain[] an 
approach to pedagogy developed before Dewey, Piaget, Montessori, and all the 
other founders of twentieth-century educational theory,” they “teach at the same 
 
334. Id. at 614–15.  
335. Id. at 615.   
336. Id.   
337. See id. at 611.   
338. Id. at 614; WEST, supra note 14, at 16–17.   
339. See Kennedy, supra note 270, at 59.   
340. Rubin, Future and Legal Education, supra note 44, at 507–08.   
341. Id. at 510.   
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level of specificity in all three years.  In effect, they are teaching three years of 
second-year courses.”342  Instead, Rubin suggest a graduated approach where 
the first year is “more introductory and foundational” and the third year is more 
interactive and advanced so that it “give[s] students an opportunity to work in 
a more participatory and interactive manner and to investigate one area of law 
in more detail.”343  The result is more subjectivity, empowerment, and relevance 
in learning law and practice so that students “develop an appreciation for the 
complexity of modern law and an understanding of the ways to deal with, and 
take advantage of, that complexity.”344   
Another concerning trend that Rubin examines is the teaching of social 
justice in law schools: “The second major social trend that is directly relevant 
to legal education is the ongoing demand, both moral and political, for social 
justice.”345  The relevance is two-fold.  First, intertwined with the knowledge 
revolution is the rising need for “people to enforce their traditional rights to the 
new products that our knowledge-based economy is producing.”346  
Technology’s drive to complexity in life will translate to protection and 
enforcement of individual rights whether in private commercial law or criminal 
law.347  Second, such advancements and corresponding legal services will need 
to be equally distributed and accessible to avoid social injustice.348  But for now, 
“[t]he challenge is that the law school curriculum, in its present form, is 
designed to train students to provide legal services to corporations, wealthy 
individuals, and prosperous small-town elites, not to the working classes or the 
underprivileged.”349  Rubin’s fault with the Langdellian method here, in the 
realm of teaching justice, is similar to Robin West’s dissatisfaction.350  Others 
in the academic world have similarly observed justice teaching as a goal of 
contemporary law schools.351   
Rubin’s reasons for changing legal education and pedagogy should prompt 
concern.  But if the fundamental pedagogy of law schools detaches the student 
from the law in the way that the commentators above have described in service 
 
342. Id.   
343. Id.   
344. Id.   
345. Id. at 513.   
346. Id. at 514.   
347. Id.   
348. Id.   
349. Id.   
350. Cf. WEST, supra note 14 at 154–55.   
351. See, e.g., Peter L. Davis, Why Not A Justice School? On the Role of Justice in Legal 
Education and the Construction of a Pedagogy of Justice, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 513 (2007); Anthony 
D’Amato, Rethinking Legal Education, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1990).   
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of a model of law that overly objectifies and distorts the reality of the law and 
the control and instrumentality of the law, then how do law schools expect to 
empower their students to be capable legal thinkers, as well as stay relevant to 
the actual nature of the law?  Are law schools just drifting on by, and is there a 
conception that could support a new pedagogy?   
Part IV will introduce one concept that seeks to address these issues.   
IV. INSTRUMENTALITY CONCEPTION 
To merely reconfigure the case method is to engender further justifications 
for the method’s continuing use and legacy in American legal education.  
Consequently, the response in Part IV charts more fundamentally toward 
creating a contemporary conceptualization of law rather than transplanting the 
practices of the Langdellian method into new waters—essentially allowing it to 
linger afloat in American law schools for educating and influencing further 
generations of lawyers.352  The intent here is to broaden and change existing 
pedagogical traditions by conjuring the topic of law school study and inquiry—
that is, law—in ways beyond the system of a nineteenth-century scientific legal 
paradigm in hopes to avoid the kind of objectification discussed in Parts II & 
III, and to bring the Subject (or Subjects) of law explicitly into the study of it.  
To arrive at this solution requires finding one underlying conception of law—
not necessarily an all-encompassing one, but a conception that will generate 
newer and less constricting ways to teach law and lawyering; a conception that 
is less empirical and hopefully less arrogant in its ambitions; one that can better 
facilitate pluralism while focusing on relevance and empowerment.  This task 
is possible if we stop trying to categorize what law is in a formalist way and 
instead begin examining and working with its characteristics, inherent 
aesthetics, and effects.  Thus, the idea of law as instrumentality seeks to do so 
in this manner.   
Previous parts of this Article have inferred and explored the fallacies of 
categorizing law as a unified body and how that distortion seeps into 
pedagogical methods with critically problematic results.353  In part, the 
movements of American legal thought that have followed Langdellian 
formalism—from American legal realism to postmodernism—have exposed 
such fallacies by their separate reactions to the assumption of law’s complete 
 
352. See GILMORE, supra note 82, at 13 (referring to the case method as “indoctrination through 
brainwashing”).   
353. See supra Section II.A.   
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unity and autonomy.354  Each movement, in its own thought, has identified gaps 
to the law that defy unity.355  Such observations could indicate either that these 
gaps exist in a present state of modernism or that the modernist movement has 
been entirely superseded by postmodernity.356  Although it seems more 
convincing that postmodernity is the current era,357 both observations suggest 
that achieving unity in law is ultimately impracticable.358  To know this truth of 
the matter, but to continue preoccupied over unity and autonomy is debilitating 
after a while—especially if that while has lasted for more than a century.  Why 
then, other than intellectual and academic complacency,359 do we still justify 
teaching only a limited set of approaches to the law by adhering to a pedagogy 
that embraces those fallacies?  Despite our modern considerations and 
presumptions of law and its practices, why are we still setting sails to chase 
after a mythical beast in the ocean in the way Langdell had once chased?   
Conversely, studying law under a concept of its instrumentality does not 
send our students out to uncover a singular unitary body of law only to watch 
them crash on rocky shores.  Law is not a mythical beast lurking out in the high 
seas for hunt.  Borrowing from Gertrude Stein, “there is no there there”360 in 
that endeavor; no beast of that mythos awaits our capture, but only intellectual 
cruelty in its mandate and the high possibilities of being led off-course, of 
academic ship-wrecks, and rumors transmitted across the high seas about legal 
education’s demise.   
Instead, there are qualities existing in law and its practices that prompt and 
beckon exploration.  When we experience the law, we experience its 
characteristics and effects.361  Studying and teaching law by starting with its 
instrumentalities is one way of accessing the inquiry into law and the various 
qualities and characteristics of its agency without the prerequisite of a ritual 
 
354. See Minda, supra note 142.   
355. See id.   
356. Id. at 388–89.   
357. See infra Section IV.B.   
358. See Minda, supra note 142, at 389–90.   
359. See Rubin, supra note 119, at 614 (describing the narrow self-interest of law faculty that 
implies complacency).   
360. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937) (emphasis added).  Stein 
used the phrase to describe her sentiments about visiting her childhood home in Oakland, California.  
Id.   
361. See Jennifer L. Culbert, Shattering Law: Encounters with Love in Billy Budd, 28 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 765 (2010) (“When this experience [of law] is described, it is usually represented 
as an experience of being subject to an external or internal will that uses the promise of physical harm, 
moral suffering, psychological pain, or social distress, to deprive us of the opportunity to achieve or 
enjoy some desired end.”).   
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established by the case method that is no longer justified by Langdellian 
formalism.  In fact, a conception of law based on instrumentality deconstructs 
the assumptions of law under formalism by studying law’s aesthetics and 
agency detached from grand narratives and ideologies.  To move from grand 
ideologies, we must start with some instability;362 and instrumentality offers 
enough multiple meanings to be a starting point.   
A. Etymology 
In law, the word “instrumentality” has its resident usage and definitions, 
but both its technical uses and meanings reveal some degree of instability as 
well.  Under Black’s Law Dictionary, “instrumentality” is defined primarily as 
“[a] thing used to achieve an end or purpose”363 and then secondarily as “a 
means or agency through which a function of another entity is accomplished, 
such as a branch of a governing body.”364  The word has its anchors in several 
different bodies of law, and both primary and secondary meanings appear 
readily in usage.  In tort law, “instrumentality” appears in res ipsa loquitor and 
strict liability cases and doctrines, typically serving as strawman or proxy for 
broadly describing the harmful conduct or items that a tortious actor can control 
to set in motion.365  In the law of business associations, instrumentality appears 
in the corporate veil doctrine as the “thing” that corporate actors use to shield 
their illicit activities behind the legal entity.366  In the criminal context, the Earl 
Warren majority opinion in Terry v. Ohio367 used the phrase, “instrumentalities 
of the crime,” in part to describe items directed in the act of police stop and 
frisk.368  Of course, more seemingly benign uses of “instrumentality” exist, for 
 
362. Cf. FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 163 (“[P]ostmodern legal theorists constantly question the 
ostensible stability of particular words as well as entire legal texts.”).   
363. Instrumentality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (10th ed. 2014).   
364. Id.   
365. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 438 (Cal. 1944) (“[T]he 
doctrine may be applied upon the theory that defendant had control at the time of the alleged negligent 
act, although not at the time of the accident, provided plaintiff first proves that the condition of the 
instrumentality had not been changed after it left the defendant’s possession.”); E. I. Du Pont De 
Nemours & Co. v. Cudd, 176 F.2d 855, 858 (10th Cir. 1949) (discussing “dangerous instrumentalities” 
in strict liability).   
366. In re Hoffmann, 475 B.R. 692, 699 (Bankr. D.Minn. 2012) (describing the corporation as 
“the alter ego or mere instrumentality of the shareholder” in the test required to pierce the corporate 
veil).   
367. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).   
368. Id. at 25.   
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instance, in federal statutory guidelines where “instrumentality” could be a state 
or private agency369 and, of course, in employment law in the realm of 
entrustment and agency.370  The word in its current legal usage does not appear 
in some modern legal dictionaries such as those reaching back to the late 
nineteenth or early twentieth centuries—for instance, Irving Browne’s 
Common Words and Phrases371 or the 8th edition of Bouvier’s Law 
Dictionary.372   However, in English law, “instrumentality” is listed in Frederick 
Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary: “[A] Solicitor is entitled to a charge for his costs 
on property recovered or preserved through his ‘instrumentality.’”373  Stroud’s 
Judicial Dictionary specifically references the use of “instrumentality” in an 
1885 Chancery opinion by an English court that referred to the agency of an 
attorney and his work.374   
From the examples above and others, we can see that the term embodies a 
degree of instability and malleability, appearing in both public and private areas 
of law; as a business entity or commercial activity; or a dangerous item or an 
item in use of perpetrating a crime; or as an item possible of being controlled 
and used for a purpose.  The word, “instrumental,” at the root of 
“instrumentality,” helps to connote usefulness or qualities in furthering a 
purpose375 and ultimately connects “instrumentality” to its meaning in legal 
usage: agency.376  But the degree of non-specification in the idea of agency 
connotes neutral ambivalence—almost ironically, a democratic one—that has 
allowed the word, “instrumentality,” to be used in both benign and harmful 
legal contexts, as noted above.377  Of course, in legal theory and philosophy, 
the “instrumental” root in “instrumentality” could also connote the theory of 
pragmatic instrumentalism that has considerable relevant dominance in 
American legal discourse.378  This Article relies on the suffix, “ity,” in 
“instrumentality” however, to sustain its ambivalence from direct associations 
 
369. E.g., Service for Public Institution or Instrumentality, Idaho Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 1357.45. 
370. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 239 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).   
371. See IRVING BROWNE, COMMON WORDS AND PHRASES (1883). 
372. See BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914).  
373. 2 F. STROUD, THE JUDICIAL DICTIONARY, OF WORDS AND PHRASES JUDICIALLY 
INTERPRETED, TO WHICH HAS BEEN ADDED STATUTORY DEFINITIONS 988–89 (2d ed. 1903).   
374. Id. (quoting In re Wadsworth [1885], CH 29 at 517).   
375. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 363, at 919.   
376. Id.   
377. See supra Section IV.A.   
378. See ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 23 
(1982).   
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with that school of thought.  Instrumentality here can be “pragmatic” or not—
just like law’s instrumentality can be “pragmatic” or not.  But in one aspect or 
another, despite some variance, all of the results of this quick etymology in 
modern legal vernacular points to “instrumentality” in law as a quality 
describing a purposeful function in its form.   
Outside of law, the plain-meaning of “instrumentality” shares some 
overlapping characteristics to its usage in law, as non-legal dictionaries 
continue to denote the word’s agency function;379 however, some dictionaries 
recognize the word’s function more explicitly as a quality and not the thing 
itself.380  As an example, Merriam-Webster lists its primary definition of 
“instrumentality” as “the quality or state of being instrumental.”381  Similarly, 
the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) registers the meaning in the primary as 
“[t]he quality or condition of being instrumental; the fact or function of serving 
or being used for the accomplishment of some purpose or end; agency.”382  
Secondarily, the OED defines the word as “[t]hat which serves or is employed 
for some purpose or end; a means, an agency.”383  In tracing its usage 
historically, the OED lists discovery of its early usage in religious contexts in 
the fifteenth century, in examples of criticizing the agencies of a passive faith 
and the physical world in relation to salvation and the Divine.384  A related 
word, “instrumentalness,” has a usage around the same time, also in the 
religious context—also pejoratively describing the failings of human nature.385  
Its root words—“instrument” and “instrumental”—both have varied extensions 
in history.  The OED lists “instrument” as being used later, though in a law 
context, to describe “a formal legal document.”386  The word, “instrumental,” 
had its “subservient” use and meanings in the fourteenth century.387  This earlier 
use of “instrumental” and the later “instrument” suggests that the actual root of 
the word “instrumentality” might be “instrumental” and that its legal 
 
379. 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1052 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989).   
380. See Instrumentality, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/instrumentality [https://perma.cc/N27A-G2A7] (last visited Nov. 6, 2017); 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 379, at 1052.   
381. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, supra note 380. 
382. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 379, at 1052.   
383. Id.   
384. Id.   
385. See id. (quoting reference to Satan’s instrumentality).   
386. Id. at 1051.   
387. Id.   
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connotations was borne out of the intervening use of “instrument” to refer to 
documents that carried some agency of accomplishing legal effect.   
From close readings of the OED’s identified earliest uses of 
“instrumentality,” one could gather that “instrumentality” was used in a much 
more materialistic and earthly connotation, associated with mankind and not 
with the works and power of God.  Indeed, this conclusion could be bolstered 
by associations of the root word, “instrumental,” (rather than “instrument”) 
with the material.388  But, as is presently within the OED, the word, 
“instrumentality,” even despite materiality, has a broad usage with an emphasis 
on the forms and qualities of agency.389  Both religious and secular examples 
conveying this observation are attached to the word’s primary and secondary 
meanings; beneath the primary meaning in the OED, the word’s qualitative 
connotations of agency have described human religious faith (“Physical[] 
instrumentality”), civil government (“instrumentality of men”), and even the 
handiwork of a particular person (“instrumentality of Churchill”).390  Its 
secondary meaning as having an agency for some purposeful end has been used 
to compare the limits of physical nature versus God’s omnipotent capabilities 
(“the subsidiary Instrumentalities of Nature”),391 a type of philosophical agent 
of faith (“[t]he moral and intelligent instrumentality”),392 illicit human 
corruption in governance (“human instrumentality”),393 and an active force in 
transforming civilization (“powerful instrumentalities”).394  In this way, it 
seems that the word’s currency is both in its slippage to fit different contexts or 
modify various subjects, and in its underlying objective to describe the qualities 
of purposefulness or capabilities of something or someone—even if, as in one 
of the religious examples above, it describes a capability (of men) that is not as 
useful compared to something else (God or the Divine).  Henceforth, as 
discussed below, law as “instrumentality” relies heavily on this explicit 
meaning of quality. 
Other associations with the word “instrumentality” are also possible.  
Beyond the legal and theoretical ideas of pragmatic instrumentalism, 
“instrumentality” in the larger vernacular could also remotely allude to John 
Dewey’s political pragmatic theory of instrumentalism “that thought exists as 
 
388. See id.   
389. Id. at 1052.   
390. Id.   
391. Id.   
392. Id.   
393. Id.   
394. Id.   
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an instrument of adjustment to the environment.”395  Again, the “instrumental” 
word-root is the culprit.  But likewise, here, as in law, the use of 
“instrumentality” rather than “instrumental” seeks to advocate for a similar 
ambivalence rather than a wholesale import of that theory.  Also, the possible 
allusion to both legal and non-legal philosophies ought to point to the word’s 
slippage.396  As we will see below, by emphasizing an umbrella usage, the 
word’s instability likens its use here with some—though not all—indefinable 
qualities of the postmodern condition.397  It offers an extensive and versatile 
use—though it is ultimately not completely comprehensive or, at least, so 
comprehensive that it swallows its meaning.398  Also what has instrumentality 
might also be relative to whom or what that instrumentality serves.  And lastly, 
the irony for now is that the word could quite possibility embody a teleological 
posture through its aesthetics and functions to describe agency or goals—which 
some approaches to postmodernism tend to reject.399  Facetiously, the 
 
395. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 379, at 1052.   
396. See FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 38.   
397. Id.   
398. In this way, the postmodern resonance or slippage in reading the word “instrumentality” for 
the purposes of establishing a conception of law in this Article harkens to the debate in critical legal 
studies about the functions of queer and feminist theories.  For instance, Shannon Gilreath has observed 
that: 
Queer theory, with its celebration of sexual violence and death and its pointed 
rejection of law as a means to change, is anchored in this kind of unreality because 
it is detached from gay people’s experiences.  This is not to say, of course, that 
those people postulating queer theory are not entitled to a claim to experiences 
that matter or are real, but only to say that queer theory proceeds from a posture 
that is swallowed by its particularities. . . .  Queer theory is, in this respect, either 
remarkably cruel or its progenitors are really quite far removed from the realities 
most women and gay people face.  Force and sexual abuse seem a lot less like a 
lovely academic game of charades when you are the one with the fist in your face.  
As an opposite of queer theory, “A feminist theory and practice attempts to 
account for the fracturing of reality, and then to make reality whole again.”   
Shannon Gilreath, Feminism and Gay Liberation: Together in Struggle, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 109, 137 
(2013) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (first citing ANDREA DWORKIN, LIFE & DEATH: 
UNAPOLOGETIC WRITINGS ON THE CONTINUING WAR AGAINST WOMEN 118 (1997); and then quoting 
Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 25, 52 (1989)).  Because of its implicit normative nature, as we will see, infra Section 
IV.B, the “law as instrumentality” here resembles feminist theory in comparison to Gilreath’s narrowly 
described gestures toward reality.   
399. Anthony E. Cook, Foreword: Towards A Postmodern Ethics of Service, 81 GEO. L.J. 2457, 
2466 (1993) (“After all, one of postmodernism’s objectives is to expose the unspoken normative and 
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metaphysical conceit would be “instrumentality’s” inherent “instrumentalism” 
or “instrumentality.”  As later parts of this section will show, this conception 
embraces approaches to postmodernism that recognizes teleology.400  What is 
clear here, for now, is that “instrumentality,” for the purposes of this Article’s 
premise, can and ought to embody a certain degree of vagueness.   
The negotiation of this word between its broad definitions as a legal term 
of art and its even more expansive applications in the plain language is where 
this Article seeks to begin using the fluid currency of the word for application 
within the thought of law as instrumentality.  Of course, this etymology is quick 
and not exhaustive.  But in this brief explication, the study reveals that 
“instrumentality” embodies an inherent strawman quality that prompts further 
dissection.  Its limits, of course, are not endless; indeed, its contours are also 
fitted within the characteristic of agency or facility for the purpose, agency, or 
ends of something else. 
That something else, of course, could be law itself.  Importing the definition 
and slippage of the word above, studying law as instrumentality could mean 
learning the law and its practices by starting from instability and reaching 
toward the qualities of instrumentality in law first in order to examine and seek 
meaning—looking at moments where the law has instrumentality and when the 
law fails to embody it.  From there, these observations of instrumentality lead 
us to an ontological perspective that uncovers multiple possible perspectives of 
what law is; what its purpose is; how it is created and practiced; where or in 
what form is it situated; what reasoning goes into that practice; who creates, 
practices, or benefits from the law; what condition is the political system that 
embodies law; what theories and histories have shaped its perpetuation in form 
and content; and so on.401  Instrumentality provides the tangible pressure point 
that provokes intellectual and practical meanings.  By looking at the qualities 
of a law that purports to have agency in fulfilling certain goals, a study based 
on “law as instrumentality” would seek out various types of questions to 
achieve understanding and knowledge.   
 
teleological commitments snuggled away in discourses claiming neutrality, objectivity, and functional 
universality.”).   
400. See infra Section IV.B.   
401. See Rubin, supra note 119, at 640–41 (discussing that to study law and practice as “a 
modern social orientation, is to observe the totality of . . . behaviors” that bridge legal knowledge, 
functions of law and lawyering, and the effects of law on individuals and societies).   
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B. Ontology 
In terms of a historical and chronological characterization, many have 
argued that postmodernity is the era presently before us.402  First, one could 
look physically at the current reality and posit that postmodernity is the 
“situation in which we find ourselves.”403  The physical and material side of 
this postmodern “situation” reflects, as J.M. Balkin notes, “an era of industrial 
practices and mass organization and production applied not to material objects 
like automobiles but to products of the mind—art and music, knowledge and 
information, accounting and other service industries.”404  In his historical 
description of postmodernity, Adam Todd alludes to this transcendence of 
technology from modernist industrial production, “when western societies 
adjusted to the use of machines in the home and workplaces,”405 to a time and 
space postmodernly “when people are becoming accustomed with computers, 
easily accessible information, and high technology.”406  That is the material 
realization of change or “upgrade” from the era of modernity into 
postmodernity.  But technology’s progression from realizing the production of 
material items in industry—which was characteristic of modernity407—to 
realizing the production of information is only the start of defining 
postmodernism because postmodernity is not just about the physical 
transition;408 it is also about the social and cultural consciousness in reaction to 
that transition to information.  Jean-François Lyotard describes this reaction as 
“incredulity toward metanarratives.”409  Others have supplemented their 
characterization of postmodernity beyond empirical observations about 
technology and information, by observing the “skepticism” people have toward 
the dominance of grand theories during modernity.410  In postmodernity, both 
 
402. FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 9 (“[W]e are presently in the midst of the postmodern era.”); 
J. M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1967–68 (1992) 
(“[P]ostmodernism is the cultural era in which we live—the era of postmodernity.”).  See generally 
JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (1979). 
403. Balkin, supra note 402, at 1972.   
404. Id. at 1974.   
405. Adam G. Todd, Painting A Moving Train: Adding “Postmodern” to the Taxonomy of Law, 
40 U. TOL. L. REV. 105, 110 (2008).   
406. Id. 
 407. See Balkin, supra note 402, at 1974.   
408. Id.  at 1972.  Not only is postmodernism a “situation in which we find ourselves,” as Balkin 
describes, it is also “a cultural response to that situation.”  Id.   
409. LYOTARD, supra note 402, at xxiv.   
410. See, e.g., Todd, supra note 405, at 110–12.   
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historical chronology and cultural psychology work in tandem to define this 
era.411  So much so that Stephen Feldman has collapsed the observations 
regarding the historical and cultural attributes of this time when he affirms how 
this current era is postmodern rather than modern.412  And consequently, the 
reflection that we are in a postmodern era leads to conclusions that “products 
or laws coming out of this period might be considered or labeled 
postmodern.”413  This extrapolation may seem too simplistic or circumstantial 
as a label.  But there is method to this conclusion.  To challenge modernist 
avowals “that postmodernism affects only certain segments of contemporary 
life”414 and that “[t]here is no postmodern law,”415 Balkin points out that the 
technological production itself of law is postmodern:  
The industrial model of production—where production is 
reinterpreted according to discrete units of production 
measurable in temporal or spatial categories—has already 
arrived in law.  We already have the seventy-hour billed week, 
the canned brief, the 500-person law firm churning out 
mountains of paper to prove its value to its corporate clientele.  
We already have mass-produced litigation and mass-produced 
judicial administration to deal with it.  Already most federal 
judicial opinions are written by twenty-five-year olds, so that 
the language of opinions does not really mean what it says, 
because it was not said by the persons whose meaning really 
counts.416   
In this way, returning to Todd’s bluntly-stated considerations that laws such 
as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and others are postmodern laws 
 
411. See Balkin, supra note 402, at 1972 (“[P]ostmodernsim is both a cultural situation and a set 
of claims about how that culture should be interpreted, altered and continued.”).   
412. FELDMAN, supra note 170, at 9.   
413. Todd, supra note 405, at 110 (citing Balkin, supra note 402, at 1969).   
414. Robert Post, Postmodern Temptations, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 391, 396 (1992) (reviewing 
FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991)).   
415. Id.   
416. Balkin, supra note 402, at 1974.  To observe the industrialization of law practice that further 
substantiates his response to modernist challenges regarding the reality of postmodernity, Balkin adds 
that 
[o]lder conceptions of professionalism have already been supplanted by an 
industrial model where service is defined in terms of discrete units of production 
that can be duplicated and evaluated on a mass scale.  The lawyers let go by large 
New York law firms after the 1987 stock market crash quickly learned that 
employment practices in service sectors, and even in professional service sectors, 
had mutated into a model of employer-employee relations quite like those that 
Ford or General Motors applied to blue collar workers.   
Id.  
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because of their enactment after modernity,417 Todd’s assertions possess 
justification.   
Beyond chronology, this Article’s interest in postmodernity focuses on 
postmodernism’s cultural and philosophical approach to reality and power.418  
In contrast to a modernist fixation on objectivity or grand theories, the 
postmodern psychology is skeptical of categorical truth—or in Lyotard’s words 
“metanarratives”419—and focuses on inquiry and observations that reveal 
multiple narratives and subjectivity in reality;420 it accomplishes such revelation 
by recognizing slippage and, as a result, rendering multiple meanings.421  In 
doing so, the rendering of meanings is often fixated with exposing where power 
lies.422  In the postmodern era, the search to expose power is where the 
skepticism toward grand narratives as a response to new historical progress of 
technology and information collides with the vast commodification that result.  
Whoever holds the key to that advancement and commodification holds the 
power.  Skepticism of that progress has the ability to expose power and the 
hegemony that replicates that power.  Because the Langdellian conception of 
law replicates hierarchy and thus withholds power, it is within this sentiment 
that this Article embeds as subversion the instrumentality conception of law.   
In examining the instrumentalities of law in the law classroom, we 
conceptualize the law postmodernly.  By isolating its instrumentalities, we can 
evaluate and find meaning in the form and aesthetic of law first without 
assuming the success of a grand idea—such as objectivity—although we might 
 
417. Todd, supra note 405, at 110.   
418. Linda Nicholson & Steven Seidman, Introduction to SOCIAL POSTMODERNISM: BEYOND 
IDENTITY POLITICS 7 (Linda Nicholson & Steven Seidman eds., 1995) (describing that postmodernism 
possesses “the tendency in elements of [other critical theories] to forget that what they were calling 
‘reason’ or ‘history’ or ‘women’ came out of a particular context and were implicated in relations of 
power”).   
419. LYOTARD, supra note 402, at xxiv.   
420. Minda, supra note 142, at 384–87.   
421. See id. at 386 (“Postmodernism emerges in response to the crisis and predicaments 
intensified by contemporary pragmatic and ironic criticism.  These new forms of legal criticism have 
brought attention to the need for tolerance of diversity existing in the larger culture.  Without doubt, 
the ‘buzz word’ in the academy today is multiculturalism.  Multiculturalism is about diversity and 
culture.  Its appeal is based on the belief of many women, gay, and non-white Americans that the 
discourse of modern law has erected a barrier that excludes minority perspectives and discourses from 
active participation in the deliberative processes of the law.  In their writing about the law, 
contemporary legal thinkers, whether they be pragmatist or ironist critics, reveal, wittingly and 
unwittingly, how legal texts, discourses, codes, and canons of legal interpretation deny the existence 
of alternative and different notions of the self.”).   
422. Todd, supra note 405, at 126–27 (citation omitted).   
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recognize that the law being studied might have been ascribed to it.  In this way, 
if we are dealing with a law premised on objectivity or autonomy, we begin to 
fracture such formalist notions.  Then as we decode the instrumentalities to find 
meaning, that interpretive act reveals the construct of law, which invariably 
implicates human subjectivity.  We can pose descriptive questions about the 
underlying purpose of that law and how it is effectuated: What goals or policies 
does the law accomplish or seeks to accomplish?  And how do the aspects of its 
form and practice do that?  And to what extent are these instrumentalities 
successful?  Or we can ask questions about the actors (or the Subject(s)) within 
that instrumentality.  First, we can ask and study what skills are involved in 
creating that instrumentality: How does the actor or subject control such 
instrumentalities to accomplish those goals behind a certain law?  
Procedurally or strategically through a type of reasoning?  How could we do 
it better?  But then, more importantly, we can also ask questions that lead us to 
answer who has power within the law: Who accomplishes those goals through 
law as instrumentality?  Whose goals are they?  Who benefits, directly or 
indirectly? Who can access that instrumentality?  Finally, though some may 
not regard this next gesture as postmodern, we can critique philosophically and 
normatively: Are such goals just or moral?  Are they socially or politically 
efficacious?  Are they political goals?  Are there any bigger goals?  Should 
there be other goals that the instrumentalities of this law do not fulfill?  An 
instrumentality conception, in this way, serves as a broad reference point that 
uses law’s aesthetics in order to critique it and, as a result, understand and learn 
about law beyond its autonomous facade; it does not accept goals behind a 
certain instrumentality in law and therefore does not embrace the teleology that 
a certain law seeks to demonstrate.  In fact, relying on a law’s instrumentality, 
the instrumentality conception provokes discussions on the success and failings 
of such instrumentality, the degrees of accomplishments of such goals behind 
law, and the subjects that are empowered and disempowered by the law.   
But the instrumentality conception is not merely descriptive in this way.  Its 
eventual fixation could be partly teleological, in a normative sense.  Some 
might argue that this fixation on teleology prevents the instrumentality 
conception from being truly postmodern in theory; after all, postmodernism has 
the tendency to fixate on a deconstructive mode to the exclusion of seeking 
normativity.423  According to some, postmodernism’s rejection of grand 
theories—which is an effective way of eviscerating formalist ideas of 
objectivity in law—can interfere with any ability to encourage normative 
 
423. See Schlag, supra note 309, at 1631.   
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aspirations in law at all;424 its ironic perseverations can be nihilistic and hinder 
that transformative gesture—and some may even argue that transformation and 
normativity are not postmodernism’s intentions.425  But to consider 
postmodernism in this theoretical way only is to value it narrowly and in some 
ways to treat postmodernism as itself a grand theory—a premise that it seems 
to reject.426  Other schools of thought on postmodernism disagree; there are 
perspectives about postmodernism that allow it to liberate inquiries beyond 
irony.427  But even according to Balkin, postmodernism can have goals.428  
Using the postmodern mode of deconstruction, for example, Balkin notes that 
even   
[t]ranscendental deconstruction has a goal; its goal is not 
destruction but rectification.  The deconstructor critiques for 
the purpose of betterment; she seeks out unjust or inappropriate 
conceptual hierarchies in order to assert a better ordering.  
Hence, her argument is always premised on the possibility of 
an alternative to existing norms that is not simply different, but 
also more just, even if the results of this deconstruction are 
imperfect and subject to further deconstruction.  Such a 
deconstruction assumes that it is possible to speak 
meaningfully of the more or the less just.429   
We come to this conclusion about postmodernism and normativity only 
however, according to Todd, if postmodernism is kept theoretical in mind to 
show an “awareness” and not too literally used and externalized as reality 
itself.430  In fact, viewing postmodernism as an approach rather than a theory 
 
424. See Todd, supra note 405, at 117.   
425. Id. at 114.   
426. See id. at 112 & n.55.   
427. Id. at 115.   
428. J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
1131, 1141 (1994).   
429. Id. (footnotes omitted) (referencing J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The 
Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 124–27 (1993)).   
430. Todd, supra note 405, at 116 (“Postmodernism, when used pragmatically, provides tools 
for dealing with the problems arising in the postmodern era. . . .  Postmodernist laws or labeling laws 
postmodern can ‘get the job done’ better than any other method for uncertain areas of the law.  When 
subjects of the law are in flux and difficult to regulate through regular normative means, 
postmodernism can be a useful tool for creating regulation where none would be possible otherwise.  
Thus, postmodern awareness can act as a tool to achieve normative human purposes.” (footnotes 
omitted)); see also Stephen M. Feldman, Playing with the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer’s 
Toolbox, 85 VA. L. REV. 151, 179 (1999) (“If one doggedly tried to follow postmodern insights to their 
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has been a way to balance its workings in legal studies.431  If one values 
postmodernism as an approach or methodology to legal studies and not plainly 
as a mere theory, then postmodernism and the instrumentality conception are 
again aligned.  The alignment is in the conception’s approach for accessing a 
sense of law’s ontology through its instrumentality.  In this way, the 
instrumentality conception may use a law’s agency to unravel understandings 
that break away false notions of objectivity and to evaluate it more critically.  
But at the same time, that unraveling should also push toward the advancement 
of law for larger humanistic and social purposes—toward some teleology that 
allows for the subjective to come through and for true empowerment.  Whether 
from a constructivist perspective or otherwise, the instrumentality conception 
allows us to question the law in a way that recognizes the human subject within 
it and not in a way that assumes some intangible objectivity or some other type 
of essentialism.  We own the law; it does not own us without collective, social 
agreement.432   
 
furthest reaches, then everything would be deconstructed, including those postmodern insights; 
imagine traveling continually outward until being caught suddenly in the gravitational field of an 
interstellar black hole that was sucking everything, including yourself, into its abyss.  So, to avoid such 
a deconstructive implosion, we always at some point manage to stop: to talk, to communicate, to write, 
to whatever.” (footnotes omitted)).  Feldman continues to note that: 
Even the most unmitigated postmodernist ultimately uses some postmodern 
insights as if they were tools or instruments—to express a point of view.  Hence, 
the use of postmodern insights in such an instrumental manner does not 
necessarily render a writer’s position or point of view prosaic.  In fact, for what 
it’s worth, although I have criticized Sunstein and Smith as modernist writers who 
domesticate postmodern insights, I usually find their work more interesting than 
that of other modernist writers who seem to have no grasp of postmodernism at 
all.  And I typically find the work of a thorough-going postmodernist such as 
Schlag even more interesting and provocative.  Most important, the work of 
postmodern deconstruction does not become trite merely because any text can be 
deconstructed.  To the contrary, if there are postmodern paths to justice, they lie 
in the deconstructive disclosure of the ever-present tacit assumptions and cultural 
values that always hide or marginalize some metaphorical Other—an oppressed 
and subjugated subcultural group.   
Id. at 179–80 (footnotes omitted).   
431. See Todd, supra note 405, at 119.  Todd observes that the use of labeling something in law 
as postmodern shows how “postmodernism can be a constructive tool for appreciating and critiquing 
laws that come out of, and contain, postmodern characteristics. . . .  The law’s fragmentation, 
inconsistency, and flux are identifiable traits that demonstrate the law’s boundaries and limitations, 
particular in contrast to modernist laws and rules.  As such, the act of labeling is a positivist exercise.”  
Id. (footnotes omitted).   
432. See Minda, supra note 142, at 382.  Minda reminds us of the problem for legal theorists 
once the human subject of the law is no longer ignored: “If the meaning of law depends on the various 
constructions of different subjects, then ‘law’ remains problematized by the identity of the subjects-in-
control of the law.”  Id.  This reminder would suggest that law is, indeed, not objective and autonomous, 
but authored by various human subjects—or in Minda’s words, “subjects-in-control of the law.”  Id.   
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Thus, the same questioning from above can and ought to be applied to 
critique and to study not merely law or particular bodies of law, but also 
political systems and institutions that effectuate the law, the process of creating 
law, and conceptualizations of law: How are the instrumentalities of a certain 
law or a legal regime furthering the ends of liberalism?  Neoliberalism?  
Morality?  Distributive justice?  Or just fair deals between private actors?  
Similarly through instrumentality, we can seek out questions in regard to a 
particular legal doctrine: What instrumentalities allow the parol evidence rule 
to accomplish judicial efficiency?  Can it be better?  Should we be concerned 
about judicial efficiency when the matter of establishing a meeting of the minds 
involves a tremendous forfeiture for one party?  Or ideas about law: Does 
pragmatic instrumentalism have any instrumentalities as a way of creating and 
interpreting law?   
Through an ontological observation and critique that bears on the law’s 
descriptive, normative, and practical instrumentalities, studying law in this way 
in spirit results in a methodology that can reveal the philosophies, the realities, 
the practice, the falsehoods, the inefficiencies, the histories, the politics, and 
many other things about the topic of law—without having to assume its 
completeness in the method.  The method does not have to be inductive, nor 
does the Socratic method need to be wholly abandoned.  They should just 
become options, among others, at the law school podium.  The law has agency 
potential and thus has qualities that assume instrumentalities, which then reveal 
other characteristics and motivations we place upon the law.  Whether law 
ought to have agency (or not) is a philosophical and metaphysical question that 
can also be part of the lecture hall debate for future lawyers as well: Why should 
the law embody instrumentality?  How do we contribute to that instrumentality?  
This perspective stretches this instrumentality conception as an epistemology.  
In comparison, although the concept that “law as science” does assert in its 
content a normative assumption that law ought to be scientific, the phrase is 
more descriptive because of the more concrete object of its modifier (science).  
Steering our inquiry and definition of law toward its instrumentalities and away 
from a presupposed scientific nature makes the inquiry less confining and, 
hopefully, much more resonating in meaning.   
C. The Instrumentality Methodology in Four Steps 
Within this Article’s subtext has been the ontological idea that one’s 
conception of law affects how one objectifies law and thus how one studies 
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it.433  In that way, as this subsection will show, the instrumentality conception 
is no different than the Langdellian conception in the way that can be translated 
into a methodology.  However, as we will see as well, the instrumentality 
conception’s broader and more neutral preoccupation leads to a more 
encompassing style of gathering meaning in law.  Under the instrumentality 
conception, a methodology for investigation of law by its instrumentalities can 
be framed in four sequential steps: (1) establishing instability or gaps in law 
that in part fractures formalism; (2) observing the fragments of law created by 
the instability that exemplify instrumentality; (3) forming meaning about law 
from such instrumentality; and (4) connecting meaning with relevance and 
empowerment.  Using a course on the law of contracts as an example hopefully 
illustrates an application of these four sequential steps.   
First, a first-year contracts course could create a contextual instability by 
beginning without law at all, but rather a societal want or need—for instance, 
the desires for human survival and societal advancement.434  The tension here 
is the supposition that without a system (or even a plan), achieving these desires 
or needs might be very difficult or impossible.  The instability is further 
externalized if we notice that in order to advance or even survive, resources 
must be shared between individuals framed possibly by a sense of 
cooperation.435  Agreements are helpful to facilitate the cooperative exchange 
of resources within a society.436  But how does a society, in order to advance or 
even survive, make sure that its members are able to agree to exchange 
resources and thus cooperate?  Human nature, after all, keeps its limits on 
altruism.  Hence, a need emerges for a system of contract-making to verify that 
agreements are made and kept, and to give recourse when agreements fail.  Now 
the instability is in the qualities of what that system of agreements would look 
like.  Historical examples of contracting can now be brought into the course to 
show students how past societal traditions have created these systems by using 
law.  What specifically does this legal system of contracting need to emphasize?  
Perhaps a legal system of contracting needs to recognize trust, good faith, 
 
433. See supra Part III.   
434. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189–90 (Penguin Books 1951) (1651); John 
Locke, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT: SECOND 
TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1690), reprinted in SOCIAL CONTRACT 3, 10–11 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1962); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in BASIC POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 141 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1987).   
435. Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1999) 
(“Appeal to a social contract can foster the spirit of cooperation and compromise.”).   
436. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).   
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fairness, honesty, and clarity as important values in agreement-making.437  
Perhaps such a legal system ought to underscore individual freedom to make 
contracts—as much freedom as the political body that houses such a legal 
system would allow.438  Or perhaps it should just dictate that individuals must 
cooperate or suffer some societal punishment.  We would need rules of law to 
further the values selected within the various governing ways agreements could 
be made.  Now suddenly the instability seems less unstable, and we start to see 
the instrumentality of law arising in the realm of contracts.   
From sociological and anthropological imperatives about agreement-
making, the course can now move into step two of harvesting the specifics of a 
system of contracting law.  From the fragments of what values a contract law 
system might promote in order to sustain and advance a society, students can 
be made to examine specifically what kinds of rules such a system requires by 
looking at the system of contracting that has developed in American 
jurisprudence.  There might be need for rules on how parties form agreements, 
who can form agreements, and what happens when formed agreements are then 
breached.  All of these rules ought to, in their own ways, reflect the overarching 
societal goals of human survival and advancement but along the way the 
combination of values of trust, freedom, honesty, good faith, and anything else 
that buttresses the agreement-making process must also be reflected.  What 
students should encounter at this stage are the gaps that prompt them to ponder 
what else do they need to know; or prod their curiosities to find out what such 
rules look like in form, and how the law can make happen the endorsement of 
the societal values it serves.   
Step three requires actual engagement with instrumentality—here in 
contract law, that would mean encountering the form in which such 
instrumentality arises through reading cases and statutory material, such as the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the Second Restatement of Contracts, or the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”).  
It could also mean encountering the content of instrumentality in the rules of 
contract law and seeing for instance, that the rules of contract formation in 
 
437. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes 
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”).   
438. E.g., Christina Eberl-Borges & Su Yingxia, Freedom of Contract in Modern Chinese Legal 
Practice, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 341, 345 (2014) (“[I]n China, freedom of contract is granted—
unlike in Western legal systems—by ordinary law, not by the Constitution.  It follows that no special 
constitutional protection applies to freedom of contract in China.  This is a substantial difference from 
freedom of contract in the Western sense.”).   
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American jurisprudence require, in part, an externalized offer and acceptance 
process, in which a meeting of the minds is approximated.439  The 
instrumentality of these rules might be examined in multiple layers: How do 
these rules serve to create agreements?  How easily do these rules serve to 
create and facilitate contracts?  What are required and how are they 
externalized by facts, language, and conduct of parties?  How do all of these 
rules combined serve the ends of societal advancement?  Or in the same realm 
of contract formation, students can be asked to see that the consideration 
requirement in American contracting tradition tries to underscore the value and 
importance of voluntary inducement and freedom of contracting.440  How do 
the rules for consideration effectuate those values?  What contours are 
highlighted in such rules—e.g. bargained-for exchange and immediacy—that 
supposedly reflect such values?  They might be asked to contrast consideration 
rules in American contracting traditions with the lack of consideration 
requirement in other contracting systems internationally.441  
Here, students can continue their evaluation of the law by tying their 
inquiries here to previous inquiries in step one about the advancement of 
societal goals—whether the nature of whatever law being discussed fulfills 
those goals that the course acknowledged in step one.  But step three is also the 
moment in the sequence where students begin acquiring reasoning skills by 
reading cases or breaking down complex statutory rules and materials.  If the 
course emphasizes American contract law, step three is where students receive 
training on reading cases critically, but also practically; where students learn 
the level of authorities in contract law; where students interpret statutory 
materials, contractual documents, or both; where students are introduced to 
factual analysis and making inferences to facilitate legal arguments and 
possibly other skills a professor would reasonably ascertain as essential for law 
students to acquire in encountering contracts materials.  Thus, step three is both 
knowledge-based and skills-based.   
In teaching with a pedagogy that emphasizes law as instrumentality, step 
four is where hopefully students uncover meaning within the law that is relevant 
and empowering to them.  For instance, continuing with the lesson on contract 
formation, step four might be where students learn how to use the 
instrumentalities of the rules for formation to argue objectively and 
 
439. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (1981).   
440. Id. at § 71.   
441. See, e.g., Amy Lee Rosen, Chinese Contract Formation: The Roles of Confucianism, 
Communism, and International Influences, 20 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 189, 189 (2013) 
(“China only requires offer and acceptance whereas the United States requires mutual assent and 
consideration . . . .”).   
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persuasively on behalf of parties in litigation.  Now we move from 
instrumentality in a knowledge-based inquiry to instruction that is strictly more 
experience-based.  Essentially, the exercise illustrates instrumentality or agency 
in the relevant skills of lawyering while it personalizes that engagement of 
skills.  Another exercise might draft students into learning how to craft contract 
formation provisions or rules that better effectuate the societal goals that ought 
to be reflected in such rules, but are also mindful of how certain parties and 
entities do business.  Specifically, this exercise might just involve legislating 
over one rule or statute but it would also allow students to see instrumentality 
in language that effectuates law, or see instrumentality in the legislation of laws.  
Again, the exercise is experiential but the experience seeks to personalize the 
engagement by placing the student as the subject of the law.  Or perhaps another 
exercise here in step four could be transactional: how do we as attorneys draft 
agreements that abide by rules of formation and to maintain the best interest of 
clients?  The students can be given a factual scenario involving the negotiation 
of a transaction (a house, an important service, a requirements contract over 
goods, etc.) and some differing parameters for each party.  Then they are asked 
to draft agreements that follow the rules of formation, advance the personal 
goals of each party, and maintain the value society places on free exchange of 
resources for advancement.  Here, this example illustrates instrumentality 
within legal documents but also develops drafting skills and experience needed 
for those students who are headed to transactional practice.  Hopefully as they 
gather the knowledge on the law’s instrumentalities in the context of formation 
rules in contracts, these exercises allow them to transfer that knowledge to 
create a more meaningful interaction with the law and lawyering.  By allowing 
them to take the meaning they have obtained in their observations about 
instrumentalities in steps one to three and transfer such learning to experiences 
in step four, students understand that they are the subjects of law.  Step four 
reveals both relevance and empowerment—relevance in seeing how lawyering 
requires both knowledge and skills regarding the instrumentalities of law and 
empowerment in the active experience in manipulating and controlling those 
instrumentalities in the law classroom laboratory.   
Thus, reaching from instability to the qualities of the contract formation law 
that underscores its instrumentality shows students both the qualities and the 
content of the law on contracting behavior in a particular society.  After 
students’ interactivity in acquiring knowledge about the law through such 
qualities in their study of the cases, statutes, and materials, their experiences of 
such knowledge in step four in the lawyering process—whether arguing, rule-
making, or drafting in the context of simulation—creates empowerment for the 
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students for engaging in law in the classroom laboratory.  Through 
instrumentality, they become the Subjects that give the Object of law its 
animating life.   
Other types of law courses can be taught using the instrumentality 
conception.  A good use of the four-step process is in the law of remedies, for 
when essentially laws fail—its instrumentality breaks down in remedial 
relief—and equity must be invoked in order to achieve desired goals of justice 
or redress.442  Legal remedies are inadequate in certain situations—perhaps 
money is not fast enough or suitable enough to address a nuisance dispute, or 
not sufficient enough to deal with infringement of civil rights.443  Or perhaps it 
is a declaration of some sort that a claimant requires, rather than money.444  In 
this context, the fragmentation of law occurs contextually as law’s failing (step 
one).  Within the gaps of that fragment, students must find the purpose of 
remedies and seek out the instrumentality of equitable relief (step two).  
Equitable relief in its various forms through case law and statutes demonstrate 
to students an alternative route to redress by governing conduct or allowing a 
judicial proclamation.445  Then students must acquire actual knowledge of 
equity and its functions through cases and discussions of how equity 
functions—for instance, learning the types of declaratory remedies, injunctive 
relief, and specific performance orders available and learning how to build a 
case for such devices (step three).  Finally, students work through simulations 
where they draft persuasive requests for equitable relief, and in particular not 
overlooking the ability to craft the remedy portion of a hypothetical that 
essentially a court would adopt to enjoin another’s conduct (step four).  They 
can also critique the limits of what can be accomplished.  Did the remedy that 
they drafted ultimately accomplish something that was sincerely efficacious or 
just?  Lawyers must know what it is they are reaching for and how to do all of 
these things.  They should also know the difference between the constructs and 
limits of jurisprudence.  Hopefully, by teaching equity through instrumentality, 
students understand the concepts of law and equity and are empowered with 
transfer of that knowledge, not only in litigating toward a remedy, but also in 
crafting and then critiquing a remedy.   
 
442. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES–EQUITY–RESTITUTION 84 (2d ed. 
1993).   
443. Id. at 86 (discussing the adequacy rule for equity); see also id. at 90 (discussing 
“constitutional rights” as a category subject to equitable relief).   
444. See id. at 53.   
445. Id.   
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D. Instrumentality in the Curriculum 
Within an instrumentality conception, there might also be further benefits 
in the law school curriculum.  By viewing law as instrumentality, an indirect 
consequence might be the democratizing of courses that were once segregated 
by subject matter division and given more importance if they were doctrinal 
courses as opposed to interdisciplinary courses or contextual ones—such as 
legal history, race and the law, feminist legal theory, law and philosophy, 
jurisprudence, and the like.  The hierarchy could erode to elevate the 
significance of these courses that were once considered, according to Duncan 
Kennedy, as part of the “finishing school” of being a lawyer,446 or those that 
reflect diversity and plurality in the curriculum if the approach to teaching law 
as instrumentality in doctrinal classes is also transferred to these classes by 
questioning where is the instrumentality of law in relation to the subject matter.  
In other words, the law as instrumentality conception is broad enough to apply 
to such courses precisely if such courses are taught in a way that makes students 
see the instrumentality of law within a historical, jurisprudential, comparative, 
theoretical, or otherwise contextual narrative.  In this way, the pedagogy works 
into the relevance of courses in upper-level law programming.  Moreover, for 
courses framed within a certain perspective—such as race, gender, or 
sexuality—an instrumentality conception across the curriculum would enable 
the exploration of subjectivity in law without perceptions of content 
marginalization raised by the dominance of doctrinal courses that tend to 
objectify law.  By de-emphasizing the objectification of law, an instrumentality 
conception would be more conducive to valuing subjectivity in the academy.  
This, in turn, would bode well for pluralism in law teaching.   
Likewise, as law as instrumentality emphasizes students’ capabilities and 
role in facilitating instrumentality, clinical and experiential learning 
opportunities in law schools would have a better co-curricular alignment.  For 
instance, law schools could more thoughtfully program curricular sequences to 
balance out the transfer of learning from traditionally doctrinal courses (such 
as contract law) with associated advanced doctrinal courses (such as 
commercial law or business associations) or skills courses (such as contracts 
drafting), or both, in upper-level offerings, and finally experiences in 
likeminded clinical courses or externships (such as transactional clinics or work 
in commercial litigation).  The empowerment effect in the instrumentality 
conception might create more meaningful experiences for students in those 
upper-level experiential opportunities.  The fundamental courses in the first 
 
446. Kennedy, supra note 270, at 61.   
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year would converse with experiential learning opportunities and courses in the 
second and third years of study.   
Ultimately, this pedagogy through instrumentality responds to students in 
ways that juxtapose them as the Subjects of law by instilling their relevance in 
the material and facilitating their empowerment.  Learning is goal oriented.447  
Relevance facilitates learning.448  Law as instrumentality is a more relevant 
pedagogical concept because it responds to reasons why people attend law 
schools: to become lawyers.449  What studying instrumentality does is ask the 
student to explore how the law works and what can be accomplished through 
its creation and its practices—what lawyers need to know about the law and its 
application.450  Thus, as seen in the examples above, teaching through this 
instrumentality conception can lead to more immediate engagement.451  In 
addition, this conception allows for teaching and inquiry on the contextual and 
philosophical questions about the law that add to law’s profound 
personalization and meaningfulness for students.452  One way to encapsulate the 
trajectory of this method is by positing its reverse-engineering approach to the 
law.  Let us just assume that that the law is ultimately unknowable.  But aspects 
of the law that are observable ought to be used for study—its functions, its 
accomplishments, its qualities and characteristics, its authors, its degrees of 
effectiveness for accomplishing goals through practice and theorizing, even the 
failings of its instrumentalities, and the teleological assumptions of those 
instrumentalities.  In practical and moral terms, our answers to such questions 
as posed by all of these observations are what the instrumentality conception 
attempts to render in its immediacy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Rather than self-destructive behaviors akin to rocking the boat or jumping 
ship, this Article has tried to conjure a sense of redemption through progress by 
charting a new direction in the philosophy of teaching in American legal 
education—one that is reflective of plurality and hopefully enlivens thoughtful, 
critical, and energizing debates in the academy for the rescue and salvation of 
American legal education.  As introduced in these pages, the instrumentality 
 
447. Timothy W. Floyd et al., Beyond Chalk and Talk: The Law Classroom of the Future, 38 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 257, 264–65 (2011) (discussing goal-oriented learning).   
448. Id. (discussing relevance in learning).   
449. See, e.g., Kyle P. McEntee & Patrick J. Lynch, A Way Forward: Transparency at American 
Law Schools, 32 PACE L. REV. 1, 56 (2012) (noting “most people attend law school to become 
lawyers”).   
450. See supra Section IV.C.   
451. See supra Section IV.C.   
452. See supra Section IV.C.   
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conception directs us away from the objectification of law by not embracing 
the aesthetic preferences of the Langdellian formalists but looking more 
ontologically in the belief that the instrumentalities of law can lead to the 
acknowledgment of subjectivity and eventually, meaning and understanding.  
The only objectification of law that occurs in this instrumentality conception 
does so in larger relation to the Subject of the law because the conception allows 
us to acknowledge our study more transparently when the act of inquiry 
involves acknowledging our own sifting through of the fragments of law in 
order to draw relevant meaning that emboldens our capabilities to advance law 
and also to critique that advancement.  A perspective from instrumentality, thus, 
tames the law for its Subject—for our students, and ultimately for us, as we all 
bring law to life.  Henceforth, this conception allows us to transfer the meaning 
of law back to an instrumentality within our control.   
To be sure, the former conception of law as science and its reflected 
pedagogy in the case method has had its place in the study of law and training 
of lawyers, and ought to have a presence in the future, as it would have within 
an instrumentality conception—just like case law has its continuing importance 
in our legal system.  But it would become only one kind of method, amongst a 
variety of methods in the same way that case law is only one kind of law.  Thus, 
the dominance of the case method should be lessened to make way for other 
methods and realities of law; and it would be lessened within the 
instrumentality conception.   
Ultimately, this conception, as methodology, seeks to reveal law’s 
relevance and use its demonstrative experiences to empower individuals.  
Lawyers have agency, and thus transitively, they personify the instrumentality 
of law as well.453  Accordingly, future legal inquiries through instrumentality 
will lead to questioning how lawyers contribute or embody agency.  This hope 
at the heart of that conception’s directive is to reveal the human in law in order 
to better educate lawyers.  American law schools and legal education also 
possess agency and instrumentality.  Our current and future students will 
become the stewards and captains of legal knowledge, thought, and practice 
long after the current cries of crisis have passed.  The instrumentality 
conception would imbue them with knowledge and technique relevant to their 
present and future stations in the law and engages them to find meaning and 
 
453. Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 
53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 1027 (2005) (“What defines the technical as a sphere of social practice, in other 
words, is lawyers’ commitments to an aesthetic of instrumentality, not simply to an instrumentalist 
politics or project.”).   
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power inwardly so that they do not just learn to think like lawyers but also to 
transform.  This vast and noble possibility in the lecture halls of law schools is 
ultimately the instrumentality that the academy must embody in revealing law’s 
meaning.   
   
 
